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Abstract
This thesis is a study in the field of organisational decision making. The focus is on
decision making where the organisation is the unit of analysis (as opposed to the
individual). It is a systemic approach rather than a behavioural or personal approach.
The methodology employed is a conceptual study, which comprises the description
and discussion of four models of decision making. Each model is discussed
individually. The models date from the late 1940's to the middle 1970's and are
known as the 'rational', 'procedural', 'political' and 'anarchic' models of
organisational decision making. In conclusion, a major problem in the understanding
of organisational decision making is discussed. This problem relates to how generic
organisational decision making activity can be understood, without having to consider
the behavioural features of decision making.
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Abstrak
Hierdie tesis is 'n studie op die gebied van besluitneming in organisasies. Die fokus is
op besluitneming, waar die organisasie die eenheid van ontleding is (en nie die
individu nie). Die benadering is sistemies eerder as 'n gedragsbenadering of
persoonlike benadering. Die metodologie is 'n konseptuele studie en behels die
verduideliking en bespreking van vier modelle van besluitneming. Elke model word
individueel bespreek. Die modelle dateer vanaf die laat 1940' s tot die middel 1970' s
en staan onderskeidelik bekend as die 'rasionele', 'prosedurale' , 'politieke' en
'anargiese' modelle van organisatoriese besluitneming. Ten slotte word 'n beduidende
probleem rakende die verstaan van besluitneming in organisasies bespreek. Hierdie
probleem hou verband met hoe generiese organisatoriese besluitnemingsaktiwiteit
verstaan kan word, sonder om te hoef verwys na die gedragsaspekte van
besluitneming.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Focus
The focus of this thesis is on decision making in organisations. The level of analysis
will be that of the organisation. The intention is to understand decision making within
organisations as a product of the organisation and not as a resultant of the behaviour
of individuals.
This approach may sound strange and may not necessarily be self-evident. Ostensibly,
individuals or groups of individuals in organisations make decisions. The organisation
as an abstraction does not make decisions. However, analysing decision making at an
organisational level allows for insight into the systemic nature of decision making in
organisations. An inquiry at a behavioural level, would allow for greater insight into
how humans make decisions. Such an approach, however, is the domain of the
psychological sciences. Our purpose is to focus on decision making as a generic
organi sational activity.
The complexity faced by organisations today (both in their environment and in
themselves), makes an understanding of decision making all the more important.
Decision making is the means by which organisations negotiate their environments. In
the context of complexity the organisational decision making process becomes
likewise complex and deserves specialist attention.
A decision is the outcome of an organisational process in which choices are made
between alternatives. This study will focus on the dynamic process of decision
making that precedes the actual decision. Put differently, this study asks the question,
how an organisation arrives at a particular decision.
In contradistinction to the usually neatly formalised and logically formulated policy
and operational decisions, the preceding decision making process is in many ways
rather nebulous. In the days when the world did not seem to be as complicated as
today, it was normally sufficient to understand the decision making process with
reference to custom, tradition and procedural rules. In today's world, these could
increasingly become routes into disaster. A more sustained and sophisticated
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understanding of organisational decision making is therefore called for. Decision
making itself needs to become an object of decision making!
Over the last few decades a number of theoretical models for understanding the
decision making process have been advanced. The models are representative of the
spectrum of approaches to decision making, and each one has attracted a significant
following. They are the rational, procedural, political and anarchic models of decision
making and have been chosen because each model attempts to deal with decision
making processes in organisations in such a way that the organisation is the unit of
analysis. Thus they focus on systemic, rather than behavioural or personal decision
making. In general, the models do not try to account for individual decision making
practices and habits in organisational contexts, but rather strive to transcend the
individual by adopting a generic and systemic understanding of decision making in
organisations.
This study will consist of a description and conceptual analysis of each of the four
models. Thereafter, a significant meta-problem relating to the understanding of
decision making in organisations shall be discussed.
The first model is known as the rational model. It has its roots in the late 1940's and
is originally credited to Herbert Simon'. It suggests that the organisation is a rational
entity in as much as it exercises reason in a systematic manner throughout all its
decision making processes. The idea of rationality itself was subsequently subjected
to debate and a series of authors have offered comments and variations.
The second model views decision making as the resultant of an iterative
organisational process. Organisations become cognisant of the occasion for making a
decision but neither the problem nor the solution is entirely clear. The organisation
embarks on a discovery process of how it would solve the problem. This form of
discovery and decision resolution has been found to be a predictable organisational
process. Furthermore, the process facilitates the tailoring and execution of an
appropriate solution. The model dates from the mid 1970's and was published by
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théorêt2•
11947
21976
2
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The third model views decision making in organisations as largely the product of
political-type interaction. Decision making in some organisations takes the form of
heated contests, where various groups of participants compete for scarce
organisational resources. Each grouping or coalition lobbies its cause and interacts in
a manner common to the arena of politics. This model, attributed to Graham Allison',
dates from the early 1970's and has its origin in the extensive analysis of the decision
making processes involved in defusing the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The last model views organisations as entities in anarchic environments (internally
and externally). In this model, organisations are viewed as spheres in which streams
of problems, solutions, decision makers and choice opportunities interact. The
occasions for decision making are determined by the mixing and intermeshing of the
various streams of organisational 'artefacts'. This model was published in the early
1970's under the title of 'the garbage can' by Michael Cohen, James March and John
Olsen4.
Examining decision making in organisations requires a clear understanding of the
notion organisation. In the following section, we shall define the notion of
organisation that is to be used throughout this thesis.
Organisations as the Context of Organisational Decision Making
For the purposes of this study, it is useful to define the notion of organisation with the
help of analyses by Karel Weick5 and Peter Drucker6.
Weick's definition of an organisation allows for the discussion of organisations in the
most general and generic sense possible. Such an approach removes the finer and
obstructing details of organisations. It helps in getting around the problematic nature
of different organisational types. Drucker, on the other hand, gives content to what an
organisation is. He assists in differentiating between types of collectives, of which an
organisation is but one. Thus an organisation is but one form of a collective activity
next to families, societies, communities and the like.
3 1971
41972
51995
61994
3
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Weick's formulation of an organisation draws on a number of authors. For our
purposes, we shall synthesise the various formulations and meta-conceptions of
organisations. Speaking about organisations in the most generic or general sense
possible, one such formulation is that of Smircich and Stubbart as enhanced by
Weick. For them, organisation " .. .'is a set of people who share many beliefs, values,
and assumptions that encourage them to make mutually-reinforcing interpretations of
their own acts and acts of others' and that encourages them to act in ways that have
mutual relevance'".
Weick also uses the terminology of vocabularies''. Vocabularies are used to describe
the common languages and premises that organisations use to regulate the conduct of
their members. For example, organisations that function well, according to whatever
measure of success that may be appropriate, do not explicitly state in minute detail
that which is expected of each and every member of the organisation, in each and
every situation. Members, by some way or another, learn the 'vocabulary' of the
organisation to such an extent that they are guided thereby. Such a vocabulary
provides a set of premises to the member so that their actions contribute to the overall
success of the organisation. In other words, there is a latent stock of knowledge in
each member of the organisation that ensures that actions are mutually reinforcing
towards the realisation of the organisation's goals.
Bearing in mind the definitions and conceptions of organisations in Weick one could
construct a definition where an organisation is conceived of as a 'shared vocabulary'.
Such a general definition allows one to get around the limitations of 'values',
'assumptions', 'shared premises' and any other common organisational artefacts that
may be considered to be central to the understanding of an organisation, but may in
themselves be subject to criticism. The use of 'vocabularies' allows one to say that
organisational members all share 'something', which makes them part of the
organisation. What the content of that 'something' is, is not always clear. The content
of the shared 'something' is not easily definable. However, what one can be certain of
is that the shared 'something' is the glue, which binds people to the type of collective
that we call an organisation. An organisation only exists when its members share the
vocabulary of the organisation. In notional terms, an organisation is not the buildings,
71985 inWeick 1995: 73
81995: 113 - 132
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or the computer networks, or the supply chains. It only comes into being provided that
it is populated by persons who share a common vocabulary. Stated in another way, if
the potential members of an organisation do not share that common idea or purpose or
set of values that commit them to a purpose, then the organisation ceases to exist. For
our purposes, we shall understand organisations as collectives that share a common
vocabulary.
'Organisation', defined in this way, is of course an abstraction and not outwardly
visible. It is a notional construct to describe a type of collective activity. Speaking
about organisations in a manner that combines Weick's various organisational
abstractions, we are able to get around comparative problems. For example, on the
surface of it businesses, government institutions and social welfare organisations are
three fundamentally different forms of organisation and hence would not be
comparable on an organisational level. However, using Weick we are able to speak
about and compare them in a meaningful manner, which would transcend otherwise
incompatible organisational differences. Speaking about organisations in such a
manner still does not tell us what the characteristics of organisation are, but does help
us to understand when the instance of an organisation comes into being.
To give content to the construct of collective activity let us consider the
characteristics of an organisation. For Drucker organisations are "purposefully
designed and grounded neither in the psychological nature of man nor in biological
necessity?". Such an understanding of an organisation indicates why, for example,
families, communities and societies could not be considered organisations.
Organisations do not exist to perform a biological or psychological function for the
self-preservation of man and society, but are rather motivated by a different set of
concerns. The purpose for their existence, according to Drucker, is based on the
following six characteristics.
Firstly, organisations "concentrate on one task"JO. Organisations have a purpose or
goal, which they pursue. In the pursuit of their goal there may be a number of other
sub goals. For example, public companies pursue the goal of creating wealth for their
shareholders, sometimes through a variety of businesses, with each business
9 1994: 43
10 Drucker 1994: 47
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principally being a wealth generating goal in itself. In contrast, families, for example,
do not have an underlying and enduring goal, but rather have variable purposes from
one time to another, typically aimed at self-preservation.
Secondly, for an organisation to achieve its goal, it needs to be a tool I I. The
characteristic of a tool reveals the functional nature of the organisation. This tool is
the mechanism whereby a particular goal is achieved. For the achievement of such a
goal, the organisation needs to have a mission, which is clearly articulated to its
members such that they are able to pursue the goal in a single-minded 12 manner.
A third and very important feature of an organisation is that key results thereof are
always external to or on the outside of the organisation':'. For example, universities
produce graduates so that they may apply what they have learnt in the organisations
that they work for'". The results of the university are external to the institution.
Businesses only enjoy profit provided that they are able to draw paying customers'".
In contrast, communities strive to protect their culture and normative orientations.
Their actions have an inward focus, with the aim of achieving the internal results of
self-preservation.
Fourthly, members participating in an organisation associate on a voluntary basis!". In
other words, a person is required to make a choice whether he or she would like to be
in a particular organisation. Whether that choice is explicit or is rather a function of
circumstance shall be dealt with shortly. In collectives such as families, communities
or societies, people are associated by virtue of birth, geographic proximity or culture
on an involuntary basis. A person did not choose to be part of a family, but was rather
born into it. This property explains why families, societies and so on cannot be
organisations, because their members are not free to join or leave the collective.
Drucker mentions that, in some cases, the choice of association may in practice not
actually exist'? In the case of a religious organisation, a person may be associated
IIDrucker 1994: 48
12 Drucker 1994: 48
13 Drucker 1994: 49
14 Drucker 1994: 49
15 Drucker 1994: 49
16 Drucker 1994: 50
171994: 50
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with a religious organisation by virtue of an obligation towards peers or parents.
Typically, a child would become part of a religious organisation by virtue of his / her
parents' participation. If organisations are collectives of people who voluntarily join
them, then organisations are required to advertise or market themselves, so that they
may attract the correct profile of person".
Fifthly, organisations are always managed'", If an organisation exists to pursue a
specific goal, then realising external results that would satisfy the goal requires a
system of accountability'", Accountability in an organisation is one way in which
managing can take place. Persons are assigned to positions, with the responsibility to
perform certain tasks. In doing so, organisations are actively going about the
management of their own internal environment as well as negotiating change in the
external environment. In contrast, very rarely does one hear of a community or family
being managed. Such forms of association are typically not managed, but rather tend
to take on a life of their own.
Lastly, organisations are autonomous entities21• This is a necessary condition for an
organisation. By being autonomous, an organisation is able to pursue in a single-
minded manner its specified goal. This goal is achieved by executing a task or a
number of tasks. The autonomy of an organisation creates one of the necessary
conditions, within which task execution can take place. Autonomy becomes an
enabler for the pursuit of a goal.
To summarise the two key ideas that need to be borne in mind throughout the rest of
this thesis: firstly, an organisation is a form of collective, which only exists provided
that its members share certain ideas or vocabularies. Secondly, an organisation is
different to other forms of collectives on the basis of Drucker's six characteristics.
This definition of an organisation will guide us through our analysis of the decision
making models. This however still does not explain why an inquiry into decision
making in organisations is called for. In the following section, the motivation for an
organisational approach is discussed.
18 Drucker 1994: 50
19 Drucker 1994: 50
20 Drucker 1994: 51
21 Drucker 1994: 51
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The Society of Organisations
Above it was stated that 'organisation' is an abstraction. This, however, does not
mean that 'organisation' is devoid of reality or is just a figment of the imagination. In
fact it is clear from Drucker's analysis that the notion of organisation describes a
fundamental reality of our contemporary world. Although it is an abstraction,
'organisation' denotes sets of relationships that are very real and distinctive. As such
organisations have lives of their own and must be distinguished from the lives of the
individuals who participate in such organisations.
To develop this point further it is useful to once more look at Drucker, in particular
his concept of a "society of organizations'P". Modem society is populated by a broad
spectrum of organisations, each performing a specific social task. The population of
organisations is virtually infinite in tasks and number. Organisations are merely the
abstractions of various collectives organised around specific tasks. These collectives
can be constituted in virtually an endless number of combinations and permutations.
This is, in fact, the predominant means of inter-personal interface in the contemporary
world. Organisations form the front for the execution of social tasks.
Typically, an organisation would decide X, Y, Z or act in manner A, B, C. Very rarely
would it be a case of person D, in an organisation E, deciding K. The decision making
process that takes place in an organisation takes place on behalf of the entire
organisation. The decision making process is meant to serve the pursuit of the
organisational goal. Furthermore, organisations as autonomous entities deal with one
another on an organisational level. For example, a business organisation may buy
another similar business. It buys the brand, buildings, people, capital and so on, but
most importantly it buys the 'shared vocabulary' of the people':', which gives the
business its single-minded focus and commonality with the buying organisation. To
illustrate, one would often come across reports in the media, where an announcement
would state that organisation X has refused to extend further credit to country Z or
organisation Y has declared a dividend to its shareholders. In the society of
organisations, organisations form the front for task orientated social activities.
22 Drucker 1994: 43 - 44
23 The 'shared vocabulary' is inseparable from the people who possess it.
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If the organisation is the dominant form of collective activity, then it would be
meaningful to investigate the mechanisms that organisations use to go about their
decision making. In fact, improving the generic forms of decision making in
organisations will not only improve the life of the organisation, but could impact
significantly on the functioning of contemporary society, i.e. as a society of
organisations.
9
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CHAPTER2
THE RATIONAL MODEL
This chapter is concerned with the description and discussion of the rational model of
organisational decision making. In this chapter, the nature of rational decision making
shall be investigated by asking the following questions: Where does rational decision
making come from? What is it and what are the underlying assumptions that underpin
both the notion 'rationality' and the model of the rational decision making process?
How do organisations, in practice, maintain rational decision making? And lastly, the
development of the model of rational decision making shall be investigated.
Rational decision making has its origin in economic decision making. Before,
examining economic decision making in greater detail, an introductory remark as to
what constitutes rational decision making is necessary. Rational decision making, as
understood today, is concerned with an iterative decision making process that allows
organisations or individuals 1 to systematically negotiate the uncertainty in their
environment, by gathering the necessary information and then acting thereupon. The
information is evaluated against a set of fixed criteria, whereupon the best alternative
is selected'. The outcome thereof is measured against the criteria and if unsuccessful,
the process is repeated as necessary. The model "utilizes a logical, sequential
1 Rational decision making can be undertaken by both the individual as well as the organisation. In
terms of the focus of the thesis this may present a problem. If rationality is to be studied on a
behavioural level, and not on systemic level, then the relevance of this model to the rest of the thesis
may be questionable. Historically, the study of rationality has taken place largely on a behavioural
level, in the context of the omniscient utility-maximising economic decision maker, i.e. individual
decision making. However, rational decision making is not concerned with the nature of the decision
maker, but with the process. The decision making entity, whether organisation or individual, is not
overtly relevant to the discussion of rationality. The rules and conditions that govern that which is
understood as 'rational' are the same for both organisations as well as individuals. In both cases,
individuals and organisations act in such a manner that they maximise the achievement of their goals in
a systematic and accountable manner. Whether individual or organisation, the process for both remains
the same. For rationality to be rational by its own criteria, it has to constitute the same premises and
processes in all contexts.
2 Choo 2001: 199
10
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approach. Decisions are made deductively ... and ... the model assumes that there are
no intrinsic biases to the decision making process?',
Economic Decision Making
The notion of economic" decision making was originally formulated by Oskar
Morgenstern and John von Neumann in 1944. According to Morgenstern and Von
Neumann, the decision maker, whether organisation or individual, always strives to
maximise his / her utility. Prior to the publications on rationality by Herbert Simon",
rational decision making was understood in strictly economic terms where "the
economists attribute to economic man a preposterously omniscient rationality.
Economic man has a complete and consistent system of preferences that allows him
always to choose among the alternatives open to him; he is always completely aware
of what these alternatives are; there are no limits on the complexity of the
computations he can perform in order to determine which alternatives are best;
probability calculations are neither frightening nor mysterious to him'" 8. In addition,
the study of economic decision making was investigated in a vacuum. In this vacuum
only ideal market conditions exisë. 10 Practically, this meant that an ideal world
existed in which persons could go about their decision making on the basis that it was
possible to gather all the information relevant to a problem, compute the probable
outcomes of all the different courses of action and then select the best suited
alternative on the basis of a particular preference function. The economic decision
3 Lathi 1996: 3
4 At the time, economic and rational decision making were synonymous concepts and were used
interchangeably.
5 Reported by Shapira 1998 in Halpern & Stern 1998: 21
61947
7 Simon 1947, 1976: xxvi - xxvii
8 Simon goes further to say " ... Within the past generation ... this body of theory has reached Thomistic
refmement having great intellectual and aesthetic appeal but little discernible relation to the actual or
possible behavior offlesh-and-blood human beings" (1947, 1976: xxvii).
9 Halpern and Stern 1998: 9
10 The following hypothetical example should illustrate the point. In a purely economic setting, a
person would want to buy a collection of goods, which offers the best possible combination of utilities
that maximise the satisfaction of his / her self-interest. Economic rationality assumes that action is per
definition guided by utility maximisation. This may not always be the case. Other considerations may
also influence decision making.
11
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making theorists believed that this was realistically also achievable. This decision
making environment, however, is extricated from a social setting. Rationality, as a
study, was not rooted in reality, but was rather posited in the world of abstractions.
From these assumptions about economic man, a model of decision making was
devised. The model outlined a process that was to be undertaken, before a decision
could be labelled as rational.
The following process-diagram (Figure 1)
graphically illustrates the typical process that
organisations undertake. In the course of
organisational experience, problematic
situations are encountered. A particular
problem would be addressed with reference to
the objective or purpose of the organisation.
Once the problem IS understood, the
organisational environment is scanned or
searched in a comprehensive manner for
possible solutions. All information relevant to
the problem IS gathered. The possible
solutions are evaluated extensively and the
best suited solution is then selected. The
selection IS done on the basis of a set of
The Process of Rational
Decision Making
Comprehensive Search for Alternative
Courses of Action
Figure 1
enduring criteria, which would ensure the Adapted from Heracleous 1994
satisfaction of the particular organisational objective. The solution is then executed
and monitored. If, however, the actual outcome varies significantly from the intended
outcome then the process is repeated. It must be borne in mind that in the spirit of
ideal economic decision making, the decision makers possess the ability to gather all
information and are able to calculate all probable outcomes, so much so that they
would always be able to select the appropriate solution, and would thus not be
burdened by a further iteration of the decision making process.
Arguably, a number of questions could be asked about such economic decision
making. What would happen, if it were not possible to gather all the relevant
information? What would happen in cases where the criteria, against which solutions
12
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were evaluated, were limited or incorrect?!! What would happen in cases where an
error of thought or judgement was made in the application of the decision criteria to a
decision alternative, i.e. the criteria were correct, but not entirely understood and
hence incorrectly applied to the decision situation?!2 What would happen in cases
where organisations become indifferent to a series of solutions? Does this indicate
that their ability to discriminate amongst alternatives is not sufficiently attuned? The
foregoing questions suggest that the rational style of decision making is bracketed in
some way or another by human cognitive ability.
In the general examination of organisational life one ought to ask whether
organisations really go about their decision making in the manner suggested by the
theorists of economic decision making. The answer seems to be 'no' . Such a
conclusion can be supported on a number of grounds. Firstly, the existence of other
models of decision making suggests that decisions could also be made in other ways.
Secondly, the process of economic decision is far removed from reality. Organisations
and their constituent individuals are not able to gather all information and anticipate
all consequences in a probabilistic manner':', The ability to know in specific detail the
full consequences of different solutions, would border on organisational prophecy.
Lastly, a category of problems exists to which one cannot ascribe an order of
preferences or optimality'". Experience suggests that economic decision making or
rationality does not exist in its idealised state. The artificial environment within which
rationality functions, is thus untenable. Herbert Simon was the first person to address
the problem that rational decision making did not describe what happened in real life.
The resolution of this dilemma lay in linking economic or rational decision making
with the behaviour of man.
II This would also be a case of not being able to gather all information regarding the problem and
possible solutions.
12 The model of economic decision making of course assumes that the decision maker is able to
calculate and comprehend the information completely, and thus one would be inclined to think that
errors of thought should not be a concern for the study of rational decision making.
13 Simon 1976: xxvi - xxvii
14 The models of political or anarchic decision making (described in Chapter 4 and 5) shall illustrate
this form of decision making.
13
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Bounded Rationality
In order to resolve the dilemma presented by economic decision making, Herbert
Simon, in his seminal work 'Administrative Behaviour' 15,introduced the concept of
'bounded rationality'. His notion of bounded rationality has had profound
implications for the understanding of the rational decision process. Organisations
recognise and man in particular " ... recognizes that the world he perceives is a
drastically simplified model of the buzzing, blooming confusion that constitutes the
real world. He is content with this simplification because he believes the real world is
mostly empty - that most of the facts of the real world have no great relevance to any
particular situation he is facing and that most significant chains of cause and
consequences are short and simple ... ,,16.
Cognitively, the experience of life (and of organisational life in particular) requires
people to simplify the world. The ambiguity and confusion in what is perceived by the
decision making entity is factored out through the use of simplifying models'". These
models are the tools by which we render the world understandable. In an arbitrary
manner, organisations may select the facts and considerations, which they believe are
crucial to their decision processes. This presents a problem: there may be no clear
basis on which an organisation chooses one form of understanding over another. This
sets the background against which Simon levels his criticism of rational decision
making. Firstly, "[r]ationality requires complete knowledge and anticipation of the
consequences that will follow on each choice. In fact knowledge of consequences is
fragmentary." Secondly, "[s]ince the consequences lie in the future, imagination must
supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them. But values can be
only imperfectly anticipated." Thirdly, "[r]ationality requires a choice amongst all
possible alternative behaviors. In actual behavior, only a very few of all these possible
alternatives come to mind,,18.
Addressing the first limitation, complete knowledge is used to form expectations of
what consequences organisational actions may deliver. Simon describes this as, "a
sort of reverse causality ... future consequences would be determinants of present
15 1947
16 Simon 1976: xxix - xxx
17 Simon 1976: xxix - xxx
18 Simon 1976: 81
14
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behaviour't'". Fragmented knowledge presents a problem to the decision maker: the
future in its entirety cannot be correctly inferred from probabilistic assumptions based
on the expected consequences of present and past events. Doing so would border on
organisational prophecy. In the absence of the accurate determination of the future
consequences, organisations and individuals approximate anticipated consequences
through expectations'", The process of expectation is imperfect. Organisations and
man do not possess the capacity to accurately anticipate on a consistent and enduring
basis the consequences of their decisions". Organisations and individuals are not able
to comprehend all the possible courses of action and the commensurate decisions that
could be pursued. Organisations suffer from the malaise of incomplete knowledge.
The only manner in which organisations can come closer to garnering the essential
fragments from a broader body of knowledge is when a "limited set of factors ...
corresponds, in nature, to a closed system of variables - that is to the extent that
significant indirect effects are absent,,22. Before organisations can begin to engage in a
systematic decision making process they have to grossly reduce the elements of the
real world into a simplified yet understandable microcosm. The variables and number
of interpretative occurrences in their environment need to be simplified and reduced.
Conversely, the level of knowledge complexity may become too high for
organisations to fully anticipate the consequences of their proposed actions and
decisions. "[B]eyond a certain complicatedness, our logical apparatus ceases to cope-
our rationality is bounded=".
March and Simon outline the process that organisations go through before they are
able to go about rational decision making in a simplified manner. Firstly, the
attainment of objectives is rather the result of finding a satisfactory alternative than an
optimal one. Secondly, the search process for the discovery of alternatives needs to be
sequential. Thirdly, programmes or procedures are developed to deal with recurring
search situations. This allows for easier identification of alternatives in similar future
situations. Fourthly, the programmes are limited to a specific set of situations and
191976: 68
20 Simon 1976: 81
21 Simon 1976: 81
22 Simon 1976: 83
23 Arthur 1994: 406
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consequences. Lastly, the programmes are all ostensibly independent of one another,
but are nevertheless loosely bound".
This process outlined by March and Simon25 creates the capacity for organisations
and individuals to simplify and reduce the elements in their environments. Firstly,
organisations strive not to find the best solution, but one which is adequate. We shall
return to this idea at a later stage of the discussion. Secondly, options and alternatives
are identified in a sequential manner, allowing for the process to be systematic. March
and Simon refer to it as being the "one-thing-at-a-time" or the "ceteris paribus"
approach". Such an approach allows the organisation to consider in isolation the
effects of a particular alternative, with all other things being held constant. This
creates the controlled laboratory environment. This however, does not necessarily
hold true for the real world. Thirdly and fourthly, 'search' programmes are established
to discover appropriate alternatives. These search programmes are designed to vastly
simplify the search activity, limiting the searcher to discrete areas, which may in all
likelihood deliver the appropriate alternative. Furthermore, these programmes are
designed to facilitate the search of repetitive type situations. Specific procedures are
designed to deal with specific types of problems. Lastly, and in keeping with the
controlled laboratory experiment approach, these programmes are executable in a
reasonably independent manner. This allows for the compartmentalisation of
problems. We shall return to the idea of programmes as a means for solving problems
in a rational manner in organisations'",
The realism of this model is seriously undermined by the limits to knowledge. All
individuals and organisations are bound thereby. Simon aptly points out that "the
human being striving for rationality and restricted within the limits of his knowledge
has developed some working procedures that partially overcome this difficulty. These
procedures consist in assuming that he can isolate from the rest of the world a closed
241958: 169
25 1958
261958: 169
27 This problem is addressed in the section below on 'Implementing Rational Decision Making in
Organisations' .
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system containing only a limited number of variables and a limited range of
consequences. ,,28.
The limits to knowledge not only influence the organisation's ability to calculate and
comprehend consequences, but also determine to a large extent the criteria against
which a rational decision is evaluated. The assigning of criteria or value judgements
to a number of possible courses of action suffers from the same shortcoming that
plagues the determination of what those courses of action ought to be. Once more, the
absence of complete knowledge has to be confronted when deciding on measurement
criteria. The basis upon which rationality is conferred on to the process and the results
is lost. The evaluation criteria create the framework or decision space within which
the undertaking takes place. Stated in another way, the criteria create the lenses
through which interpretation takes place. Thus, if you were to inadvertently construct
faulty or inappropriate criteria, your decision process would be flawed. In rational
decision making, the assumptions of your model determine to a large extent the
results of your decision making process. These assumptions need to be applied
correctly, before the decision making model will deliver the desired outcome. 29
This has the following implications for rational decision making: Is it possible that,
given the incomplete state of knowledge, an organisation will ever know whether it
has selected the correct criteria by which to evaluate its decisions and consequences?
Does this suggest that there are certain ultimate criteria for rationality, which are
independent of human intuition or comprehension? If this is so, the discussion of
rationality will lead us back to the profound issues of epistemology addressed by
Hume and Kaneo, which go well beyond our modest framework of organisational
theory. We cannot answer them, but need to be cognisant of them. Time and again,
we face the hurdle of limited knowledge. Criticism of the rational decision making
281976: 82
29 An analogy can be taken from physics. If you were to predict the path of light, with the use of
Newtonian physics prior to Einstein's 'Theory of Relativity', then you would arrive at the incorrect
answer. The scientific models used for the measurement of the path of light prior to Einstein rest upon
different assumptions than those that he assumed (Russell 1925, 1997: 91 - 92). For an interesting and
understandable discussion of the 'Theory of Relativity' it is worth reading Russell's (1925) 'ABC of
Relativity' .
30 For a very accessible overview of Hume and Kant it is worth reading Russell 1961: 634 - 647 & 675
- 690 respectively.
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model keeps on returning the discussion to the metaphysical and ontological
predicament about 'what we can know'.
The rational model of decision making has enjoyed much attention, despite Herbert
Simon's objections thereto. The ideas that complete knowledge and optimal decisions
were not possible were accepted, and the debate surrounding rational decision making
moved on to ascertaining whether it was still possible to make rational decisions in
real world situations. It was recognised that there is often a mismatch in the rational
decision making situation between what organisations would like to believe they
know and what they actually needed to know. 31 In real life the intended outcome
would very rarely match the actual outcome. Typically, organisational participants
would search for information for as long as they thought necessary or until they felt
that they had covered the relevant ground. Thereafter, alternatives were generated and
outcomes calculated, whereupon a decision was made which would with reasonable
certainty deliver the best consequences. This being an imperfect process,
organisations typically search for satisfactory alternatives, not optimal ones.
" ... [D]ecision making, whether individual or organizational, is concerned with the
discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it
concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal altematives't'". "In actual
organisational practice, no one attempts to find an optimal solution for the whole
problem. Instead, various particular decisions, or groups of decisions, within the
whole complex are made by specialized members or units of the organization. In
making these particular decisions, the specialized units do not solve the whole
problem but find a satisfactory solution for one or more subproblems, where some of
the effects of the solution on other parts of the system are incorporated in the
definition of 'satisfactory't'". This manner of problem solving relies on solving the
minor subsets of a larger problem in an adequate manner. Having done so the
resolution of minor problems would, hopefully, have contributed to the resolution of
the major or overarching problem in a coherent and adequate manner.
31 A series of authors endorsed this point of view and began to further the debate of rationality on more
realistic grounds. Of the most notable include Michael Cohen, James March, Johan Olsen and Herbert
Simon himself.
32 March and Simon 1993, 1958: 191 in Choo 1998: 165
33 Simon 1958: 272
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A further complication arises when rational organisations interact with entities that do
not behave in a rational manner. Rational entities have no way of accounting for non-
rational behaviour. In order for rational entities to interact they would have to guess
rather than predict the behaviour of the non-rational entities. The consequence of such
a predicament lands organisations" ... in a world of subjective beliefs, and subjective
beliefs about subjective beliefs. Objective, well-defined, shared assumptions then
cease to apply. In turn rational, deductive reasoning - deriving a conclusion by
perfectly logical processes from well-defined premises - itself cannot apply. The
problem becomes ill defined,,34. The model of perfect rationality breaks down under
conditions where perfect knowledge is not possible or where other actors within the
larger environment of the rational organisation do not act in a rational manner
If organisations do function in the absence of perfect knowledge, we may continue in
this line of reasoning and ask whether organisations are at all able to make the
'optimal' decision? 35There does not seem to be a basis on which such an assertion
can be made. Rationality as an executable process is bound to the circumstance and
the situations wherein it is posited. Thus, the rationality is relative to the context.
Furthermore, bounded rationality is aimed at adequate results; i.e. results, which
chiefly solve problems but which are not necessarily optimal. 36When dealing with
the determination of satisfactory alternatives in decision making, the yardstick by
which each alternative is measured determines which alternatives meet the minimum
requirements, and not which alternatives set the highest standard. A search for
satisfactory alternatives, within a given criteria framework, precludes the possibility
of knowing with certainty what an optimal alternative may be. 37
The core criticisms of rational decision making can now be summarised as follows.
Human and organisational capacity is limited in the extent of its ability to gather and
34 Arthur 1994: 406
35 Rational decision making in the mould of economic decision making at least suggests that 'optimal'
decisions are possible.
36 For example, rational decision making can be likened to running a hurdles race; to win the athlete
only needs to clear the hurdles and finish the race first. Success is not necessarily dependent on
jumping the highest and rurining a record time, it is merely about getting over the hurdles and crossing
the line first.
37 A search for a satisfactory alternative may of course incidentally deliver an optimal alternative, that
is to say by chance.
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comprehend the information in its environment. Organisations and humans thus make
decisions where the criteria for evaluation and the decision itself are based on
incomplete information. This necessarily binds the decision and its consequence to the
environment within which it takes place. Hence, decision making which is thought to
be rational is in actual fact always limited by a particular set of circumstances. This
being so all decisions made in a rational manner are actually cases of bounded
rationality". In a climate of incomplete knowledge, rational decision making,
understood as economic decision making, is not tenable. Rather, it would seem that
when rational decision making is spoken of in the organisational context, then
'systematic' decision making is actually being referred to.
The difference between the two is significant. The former assumes a perfect world in
which the decision maker has control and comprehension of the entire decision
making process. The latter suggests that a decision making process is standardised
and can be repeated in the same manner in future. This gives consistency to the
process and allows for comparison and evaluation. Systematic decision making does
not make any claims as to the information requirements or computational abilities of
the decision maker. It merely allows the decision maker to undertake an iterative
decision making process, which can be accounted for and justified on certain
organisational grounds.
If perfect rational decision making is an unattainable end, how would organisations, at
least, make decisions, which are boundedly rational?
Implementing Rational Decision Making in Organisations39
Organisations that intend to go about their decision making in a rational manner,
practically face the prospect of failing to do so. What measures should be employed to
regulate the behavioural conduct of the decision makers, such that it contributes to the
overarching rational intentions of the organisation?
One of the simplest (and probably least practical) yet most intuitive solutions to this
problem would be to ensure that every decision making centre in the organisation
goes through the actual rational decision making process. This, however, is laborious
38 Simon 1997: 29
39 This section takes a behavioural approach, because we are considering the actual executor of the
decision. In most cases, that would be a human being.
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and requires all organisational participants to have the required level of intelligence,
so that they can go through the process and arrive at the appropriate decision by
evaluating the outcomes against the desired outcomes. This is not practical, especially
in large organisations, where many routine decisions need to be made. Thus rule-
based decision making came into being.
James March has made significant contributions to the study of what organisations do,
when they intend to regulate decision making. His thesis is that organisations make
use of rule-based decision making processes that regulate the processes and produces
predictable outcornes'". Organisations develop certain rules and regulations that
control or perhaps dictate decision making procedures. These rules are thought to
integrate and internalise past experience, and are designed such that the following
thereof would ensure a continued maximisation of the organisation's preferences and
objectives. However, March, reporting on the ideas of Bums & Flam41, March &
Olsen" and March & Simon'' says that the " ... conception of decision making as
resulting from consequential, preference-driven choice is not always accepted as
axiomatic. In particular, it has been argued that theories of rational, anticipatory,
calculated, consequential action underestimate both the pervasiveness and intelligence
of an alternative decision logic - the logic of appropriateness, obligation, duty and
rules?". This presents a problem for rational decision making.
If March's supposition is, in actual fact correct, then the decision making that
organisations engage in is not necessarily rational. Following rules in a decision
making process is not a sign of rationality, but merely one of conformity of behaviour
and consistent action". Rationality requires the constant evaluation of outcomes
versus objectives in an iterative manner that ultimately brings the organisation closer
to achieving its intended goal. However, the case seems to be that "[m]uch of
behaviour in organisations is specified by standard operating procedures, professional
standards, cultural norms, and institutional structures linked to conceptions of
40 March 1997 in Shapira 1997: 17
41 1987
42 1989
43 1993
44 March 1997 in Shapira 1997: 17
45 March 1997 in Shapira 1997: 17
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identity'ï'". De facto decision making practice in organisations (i.e. rule-based
decision making) is concerned with the perpetuation of and reflection of an
organisation's identity and culture, and is not necessarily concerned with maximising
the organisation's objectives.
To use an analogy, organisations are comparable to families. Not every decision that
is made in a family is aimed at maximising some tangible goal, but is rather aimed at
maintaining an aspect of cultural and emotional familial meaning. These decisions
perpetuate aspects of a family's identity and social practice. In the same way, March
suggests that organisations do not necessarily engage in rational decision making, but
merely use a decision process that has internalised aspects of the organisation's
culture, traditions and appropriate responses. There seems to be very little rational
logic therein.
What does this mean for the organisation? In principle, a situation may exist where an
organisation's current rule-based decision making practices are concurrent with the
rational outcomes that the organisation wishes to achieve. It would be naïve to say
that an organisation's decision rules and the actual desired rational outcomes are
coincidental to one another. Organisations, after all, exist to pursue a goal or
maximise a particular social function. An organisation's decision making apparatus,
structures or approaches are geared towards that. Conceivably, there are cases where,
over time, an organisation internalises so much of its experience and culture into its
decision processes that the outcomes of such a decision process start to diverge from
the desired goals of the organisation. This illustrates, in effect, that organisations are
able to approximate their rational objectives with rule-based decision making,
however, such decision making is bound by it own logic and is not necessarily
enduring, and cannot necessarily ensure, in the long-term, the preservation of rational
objectives.
Rule-based decision making can of course in practice be executed in a successful
manner. This, however, requires a process of identity construction and matching. The
decision maker is required to recognise an occurrence and match it to the appropriate
decision rule. The process can be briefly outlined as follows: "Decision makers
classify situations into distinct categories that are associated with identities or rules.
46 March 1997 in Shapira 1997: 17
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... Decision makers have a conception of their personal, professional, and official
identities and evoke particular identities in particular situations. . ..Decision makers
do what they see as appropriate to their identity in the situation in which they find
themselves,,47. The process of rule-based decision making is concerned with what is
appropriate to a particular situation. The logic of appropriateness may be derived from
prior experience, from what has previously worked or what may be socially
acceptable in such a situation. This approach is not without problems. Cases may exist
where more than one rule is appropriate to a particular situation, which then in itself
provides a decision dilemma. In such cases, the organisation needs to have an
alternative deciding mechanism as to what rule should govern the problem. Another
problematic possibility exists when an organisation is not able to clearly define the
situation, i.e. it is not able to make coherent sense of its environment. Does rule-based
decision making then present the solution that would best serve the maximisation of
the organisation's rational objectives?
Despite certain shortcomings, rule-based decision making does offer an advantage in
so far as it is consistent and systematic, i.e. it is done in a repetitive manner and has a
particular logic behind it. It does not require of the decision maker to engage every
time in the explicit calculation of a particular decision situation, but rather offers a
simple manner in which the decision situation can be resolved, upon the basis of prior
anticipation". In general, rule-based decision making, designed for that purpose,
furthers the rational objectives of an organisation. However, such decision making
becomes problematic when the organisation exercises rule-based decision making that
does not consistently serve the rational intentions of the organisation.
Rational decision making can also be undertaken by developing and instituting
programmes and standard operating procedures (SOp'S)49. "Programmed activity
generally involves a great deal of problem-solving of a rather routine and reproductive
sort,,50.Programmed activity is a set of preconditioned responses, which are set off in
47 March 1997 in Shapira 1997: 17
48 Shapira 1998 in Halpern & Stem 1998: 34
49 SOP's are also a form of rule-based decision making. A SOP is simply a collection of rules, which
dictate a certain pattern of'behaviour,
50 March & Simon 1958: 177
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response to environmental cues". These programmes may be highly complex in
nature and execution. March & Simon use the illustration of a partly constructed
motor vehicle appearing in front of an assembly line worker52. The assembly line
worker receives the cue to enact a program, which has as the outcome a contribution
to the completion of the car. SOP's can be subject to the same criticism as rule-based
decision making. However, as far as SOP's are concerned, they are designed to
maximise the organisation's objective in the most rational manner possible. Thus an
assembly line worker would contribute to the maximisation of the organisation's
objective, by executing the SOP that he or she is responsible for. Such a procedure
would be a form of institutionalised rational decision making. In the short term,
SOP's are able to maximise an organisation's objectives. However, over a longer time
horizon, SOP's will need to be adjusted such that they stay consistent with the
changes in the external and internal environment of the organisation and are
commensurate with the objectives of the organisation.
In cases where the decision dilemma presented by rule-based and SOP-type decision
making is not resolved, decision making would be undertaken by evaluating each
problem in an isolated manner according to the method of calculative rationality '.
Situations, which are either new to the organisation or to which a number of rules can
be applied, require a methodology or mechanism that will resolve problematic
situations. One of the ways in which organisations can resolve such situations, is by
referring the predicament to a decision centre that is capable of resolving such
problems. An expert, group of experts or an expert system would be able to fulfil such
a function. Experts, in particular fields, are called so, due to their ability to internalise
and comprehend all or most of the information that pertains to a particular area.
"Experts possess more categories, and more linkages among categories than do
novices ... The large set of associations that provides for flexible category construction
also allows a given problem, choice or other situation to be represented in multiple
ways,,54. Experts are ideally suited to resolve non-routine problems. They possess the
51 March & Simon 1958: 141
521958: 141
53 Calculative rationality will be discussed shortly.
54 Feldman & Lindell 1989 in Horowitz 1989: 97
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necessary sense making abilities and breadth of knowledge to deal with situations that
do not fit into the parameters for which the decision rules were designed.
Expert systems, in this context, largely refers to computer-based systems, which offer
decision support. These systems are instrumental in generating the possibilities and
scenarios that a decision situation may require. Feigenbaum defines an expert system
as "" .an intelligent computer program that uses knowledge and inference procedures
to solve problems that are difficult enough to require significant human expertise for
their solution. The knowledge necessary to perform at such a level, plus the inference
procedures used, can be thought of as a model of the expertise of the best practitioners
of the field,,55. It must, however, be borne in mind, that expert systems have a built-in
limitation, being the assumptions upon which the system is built. Such a system
would only be useful in particular contexts. In addition, expert systems may be used
to describe groups of people who are genuinely experts within a particular field and
who possess the appropriate understanding and insights to deal with particular types
of problems. Experts and expert systems provide a way in which organisations can go
about arriving at their desired end in a rational manner. The knowledge component
which experts possess (with regards to a particular problem) allows them to bridge
situations of incomplete knowledge and understanding. Experts are able to satisfy the
informational requirement of rational decision making.
Additional Developments
We may now ask how the model of rational decision making developed further or
what variations thereof were subsequently offered? Continuing with Herbert Simon's
contributions to the study of rationality, a number of definitional distinctions of
rational decision making have been made. The different conceptions of rational
decision making belong to the body of knowledge on bounded rationality.
Individuals and organisations are only 'intendedly rational'j". Despite endless
endeavours, humans and organisations will never be able to make perfectly rational
decisions as understood in the abstract and theoretical sense. Cognition and
organisational abilities are limited. Thus, being intendedly rational describes the
individual or organisation striving to engage in rational decision making, however not
55 In Barr, Cohen and Feigenbaum 1982 reported by Dankel 1989 in Horowitz 1989: 256
56 1976: xxviii
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entirely succeeding due to being limited and subjected to particular environmental and
human constraints'".
Simon makes use of the definitions of 'subjective' and 'objective' rationality.
Subjective rationality can be defined as the attainment of a goal, by an individual, that
is relative to what is known about a situation or is subjectively perceived.". Objective
rationality can be defined as the attainment of a goal, which is in actual fact consistent
with the goals of an organisation or a larger systerrr'". At a behavioural level, the
following example illustrates the distinction quite well: "When a subjective test is
applied, it is rational for an individual to take medicine for a disease if he believes the
medicine will cure the disease. When an objective test is applied, the behavior is
rational only if the medicine is in fact efficacious,,60.
This distinction deals with the position of the observer / decision maker and the
completeness of knowledge that the observer / decision maker has about the rational
decision making process. If an individual is the judge and executor of the decision
process, and the decision, given his or her limited knowledge and insight, is believed
to be consistent with the realisation of his or her goal, then it is subjectively rational.
The decision is rational on the basis of the subject's own judgement thereof,
regardless of whether it has the intended result or not. However, the same decision
viewed from the perspective of a group, organisation or as a product of a larger
system may not necessarily be considered rational. The decision is only objectively
rational provided the outcomes of the subjectively rational decision are consistent
with the criteria and desired outcomes of the group, organisation or larger system?'.
Evidently, the knowledge content for the different observers of the decision making
process (the subjective and the objective) differ. For the individual, it is rational by his
/ her own standards, for the group, organisation or system the decision of the
individual is only rational provided it serves the group, organisation or system. The
implication for organisations is quite important - what is rational for the individual is
not necessarily rational for the organisation. This once more points to the inherent
571976: xxviii
58 Simon 1976: 243
59 Simon 1976: 76
60 Simon 1976: 76
61 Simon 1976: 243
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relativity of the model of rational decision making. The position of the observer
determines for whom the conditions of rationality are met.
Simon makes the distinction between 'organisational' and 'personal' rationality. For
our purposes, we are only interested in the former. The former denotes that a process
or the outcome of a decision is organisationally rational, provided that it serves the
ends or goals of an organisation. Personal rationality is at the other extreme and
pertains to the maximisation of individual goals within the organisation'f. In a similar
way, organisational and personal rationality may to subjective and objective
rationality. Arguably, on a behavioural level, they may even be the same.
Lastly, Simon defines 'conscious' rationality. Conscious rationality is the result of the
decision making entity consciously making adjustments to the process of arriving at a
particular goal. The decision maker (whether an organisation or individual) is
cognisant of all factors and influences. Accordingly, adjustments are made to the
process or means in order to achieve a desired end. Closely related is 'deliberate'
rationality", Deliberate rationality is an operationalisation of conscious rationality,
i.e. the organisation goes about, in a deliberate manner, to manipulate the means-end
process for the attainment of the organisational objective'". Both these variations of
rational decision making are meant to show that the process for rational decision
making can be deliberately manipulated in such a manner that the intended outcome
can be achieved.
Rationality can also be understood as the result of calculation, i.e. an intended
outcome is the product of the understanding, calculation and manipulation of a
particular set of variables. This form of rational decision making is actually economic
decision making and is referred to as calculative rationality. Various types of
calculative rationality exist.
Cyert and March identified 'adaptive' rationality". This type of calculative rationality
is part of the evolution of the model of bounded rationality. Its central tenet is that
organisations adapt themselves over time to satisfy their preferences. Thus, an
62 Simon 1976: 77
63 Simon 1976: 76
64 Simon 1976: 76
65 1965: 99
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organisation will continue to make similar decisions in future that are consistent with
its set of preference. Conversely, decisions which negate its system of preferences are
avoided'". The model of adaptive rationality is rational in so far as experience guides
organisational learning and preferences are equated with the criteria against which
organisations measure the success of their selected courses of action. Thus, each
experience refines the organisation's ability to discern those factors that contribute to
the realisation of its preferences and those that do not. In a systematic manner, the
organisation becomes better and better at the iterative process of decision making.
Organisations learn from previous experiences and then adapt the process that they
engage in to further the objectives of their organisation, without repeating previous
mistakes. Organisations internalise the information and experiential learning from the
previous mistakes into the rational process'", Stated slightly differently, organisations
over time gain greater clarity as to what they want to achieve and how they ought to
go about it. Such an approach, however, assumes a predictable, stable and slow
changing environment. This process takes place in an incremental manner as the
learning experiences are internalised into the organisational decision making model.
This form of adaptive rationality also ties in very neatly with Lindblom's 'disjointed
incrementalism'I". Disjointed incrementalism is a case where the organisation keeps
on making decisions in an incremental manner. Each time new information becomes
available and has an influence on prior decisions, those decisions are modified
accordingly. This is evidently a case of bounded rationality, in so far as the previous
decision was a product of its circumstance. However, as soon as new material
information becomes available, it is realised that the previous decision was not
necessarily optimal and hence requires modification. Caution needs to be exercised, in
processes that are clearly disjointedly incremental. Decisions and their subsequent
results often seem disconnected from the prior decisional situations'". However, over
a longer time horizon, such changes may indeed be connected and may divert the
organisation's attention away from achieving the goal it is actually pursuing. Put
differently, organisations become so caught up in the detail of what they are busy with
66 Cyert and March 1965: 99
67 Shapira 1998 in Halpern & Stem 1998: 25
68 Reporting on Lindblom 1959, Sofer 1973: 166 - 167
69 Choo 1998: 167
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and their horizon of comparison is so short, that they fail to recognise the larger trend.
In such cases, rational treatment of the micro issues results in the unintended attrition
of the macro objective. Hence, the field of policy exists to guide the overall decision
making process. However, even policy processes in organisations can take place in an
incremental manner. "Policy is not made once and for all, it is made and re-made
endlessly. Policy making is a process of successive approximations to some desired
objective in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration't".
Remaining within the confines of calculative rationality, March71 has made reference
to 'limited' rationality, 'contextual' rationality and 'process' rationality+ Limited
rationality conceives rational decision making as a process that vastly simplifies and
reduces the problem environment. This is an enactment of the awareness of the
limitations of human and organisational capacity to scan the environment in an
exhaustive manner.
Contextual rationality is concerned with understanding the impact that the social
environment, wherein the decision making process is to take place, has on the
decision making entity". At any given time, the decision making entity has to
consider a number of social factors, which may influence the decision. The social
factors and / or distractions in the social environment may also determine the extent to
which the decision making entity's attention is directed to the problem.
Process rationality is an interesting case. Here the rationality of the decision making
process is concerned with whether the process itself stands up to rational scrutiny.
Process rationality is concerned with the process taken to arrive at the decision and
not so much with the outcome". Thus the underlying generative process is
considered, i.e. how and why did an organisation arrive at a particular process for
making a decision? What process was undertaken to arrive at the decision? The
questions asked with this model are primarily concerned with whether the process of
decision making is systematic. In other words, can the process be defended when
70 Sofer 1973: 167
71 1978
72 In Halpern and Stem 1998: 25
73 March 1978 inHalpern and Stem 1998: 25
74 March 1978 inHalpern and Stem 1998: 25
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measured against a set of criteria, which putatively governs the process of rational
decision making in organisations? 75
March also coined the term 'selective' rationality". Selective rationality describes the
behaviour of organisations that are selective in their use of rational decision making.
In other words, organisations, whether deliberately or inadvertently, go about their
decision making processes in an inconsistent manner, i.e. one particular decision may
be made in rational manner whilst another may not. This version of rationality is
probably quite a good approximation of decision making in real organisational life.
The last of March's contributions to the definitional distinctions of rationality is called
'posterior' rationality". Such a conception of rationality is an ex post facto exercise in
the analysis of a decision making process. Once a certain decision making process has
delivered a particular outcome, the process and its results are considered and if it is
found that the outcomes are consistent with the maximisation of the objective of the
organisation, then the process is viewed as rational.". Due to the retrospective view of
the process, a case may be argued that the rationality of this type of decision making
process is incidental. In other words, a decision is made and executed with certain
outcomes. There is no particular method to the decision making process, such that it
can be labelled as rational from the outset. However, upon retrospective
consideration, it may become apparent that the achieved outcomes are consistent with
the organisation's desired objectives. If the outcomes are consistent with those desired
by the organisation and the process itself meets the criteria of rational scrutiny, then
the process is labelled as rational.
A further form of bounded rational decision making is 'game' rationality. Originally,
the theory is attributed to Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann'". Game
75 Such a process can be tested hypothetically. The test determines whether an outsider with the same
knowledge about the situation and with the same calculative capacity would make the same decision.
76 Reported by Shapira 1998 in Halpern and Stem 1998: 25
77 Reported by Shapira 1998 in Halpern & Stem 1998: 25
78 Reported by Shapira 1998 in Halpern & Stem 1998: 25
79 1944
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rationality is also known as game theory'". The underlying premise is that each
situation is bound by certain rules and organisations need to merely uncover those
rules, and then plot an appropriate strategy in order to succeed against their
competitors". Thus, by understanding the rules and constraints that govern a
particular situation, an organisation can achieve its ends. If the rules are known and
treated in a systematic and logical manner, then it is quite possible to achieve success.
In an attempt to understand game theory, the academic community developed
numerous mathematical and statistical models, engaged in countless explorations and
created a number of thought experiments. Attributed to Albert Tucker82, the most well
known of these is the 'prisoner's dilemma'. Dearlove outlines the dilemma briefly:
" ... an imaginary scenario involving two prisoners accused of the same crime. During
interrogation in separate cells they are each told that if one confesses and the other
does not, the confessor will be released while the other serves a long prison sentence.
If neither confesses, both will be despatched to prison for a short sentence, and if both
confess they will each receive an intermediate sentence. By working through all the
possibilities, the prisoners conclude that the best decision is to confess. As both reach
the same decision they receive an intermediate sentence'Y. The prisoner's dilemma
illustrates very well the conditions that govern the outcome of decisions. In the
absence of mutual knowledge, organisations arrive at decisions based on the
calculation of what the counter party is most likely to do.
The relevance of game theory to organisations is that certain organisational
environments are suited to game theory decision making styles. One such example
would be regulated markets. In such a case, institutional parameters dictate how
competing organisations are supposed to behave. A natural conclusion would be that,
given the rules of the market place, organisations could systematically find loopholes
80 Game rationality / theory is quite an important area of study and can become very mathematical. lts
mathematical nature allows for numerous applications in the business and organisational decision
making environment.
81 Dearlove 1998: 46
82 1950
83 1998: 46 - 47
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to exploit, or devise strategies that would allow them to achieve the best possible
results 84.
From an academic perspective, game theory has developed even further. In 1950,
John Nash introduced the idea that at a certain point in a game theory scenario, given
the strategic decisions of others, participants would reach the limit of their
competitive position'". At this point, in a particular game scenario, a form of
stalemate will have been achieved. This is known as 'Nash' equilibrium - i.e. as the
prisoner's dilemma illustrates, players cannot improve their competitive position,
even if they were to adopt a different strategic approach.
In 1976 a further significant development of rational decision making was published,
namely the procedural model of Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théorêt. It is to this
model that we now turn.
84 Dearlove 1998: 47 - 48
85 Reported by Dearlove 1998: 47
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CHAPTER3
THE PROCEDURAL MODEL 1
This chapter is concerned with the description and discussion of the procedural model
of organisational decision making. In this chapter, the nature of procedural decision
making shall be investigated by examining the organisational decision making phases
and routines. Thereafter, further developments of the model shall be considered.
The procedural model of decision making, was published in 1976 by Mintzberg,
Raisinghani and Théorêt2 under the title The Structure of "Unstructured" Decision
Processes and was developed after studying the decision making processes and
patterns in twenty five organisations.
The model primarily views decision making as the resultant of a process or series of
processes that an organisation needs to undertake before being able to make a
decision. In the case of procedural decision making, an organisation reacts to an
occurrence in its environment, however, the appropriate course of action is only
arrived at through an iterative organisational process of discovery. Once
comprehension of the problem has taken place, a further iterative process is
undertaken, by means of which an appropriate solution can be found and thereafter a
decision can be made.
At the time, their article significantly added to the limited body of knowledge and
furthered the debate on organisational decision making. Their focus was to uncover
the systemic properties of decision making in organisations. They were looking for
the 'universals' or 'generalities' in organisational decision making. The impetus for
their paper was the very limited research that existed on decision processes that were
not structured. Prior to 1976, a significant number of studies had been undertaken on
the topic of institutionalised decision making. However, these studies typically looked
at standard operating procedures, routinised decision processes and other
organisational processes, which could be described and quantitatively analysed.'.
IAlso known as 'The Model of Organisational Process'.
2 Hereinafter we shall refer to 'Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théorêt 1976' as 'Mintzberg 1976'
3 Mintzberg 1976: 246
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These studies said very little about how organisations actually made decisions". The
interest of Mintzberg ' lay in the study of decisions that were not part of the normal
course of organisational activity. These decisions typically result from non-recurring
and / or infrequent cues in the organisation's environment, and which the organisation
is not prepared for or is not able to comprehend fully in advance. In general,
organisations do not necessarily have in their decision making apparatus the
institutionalised means to solve non-recurring or infrequent problems. Organisations
are usually good at solving recurring problems through their institutionalised decision
making routines, however, unfamiliar or new problems typically do not fit into the
process of routinised decisions and require some sort of ad hoc handling.
Unstructured decisions are understood to be "decision processes that have not been
encountered in quite the same form and for which no predetermined and explicit set of
ordered responses exists in the organisation'".
The study of Mintzberg uncovered an implicit order to unstructured decision making.
Any problem or issue that has never been encountered before would be dealt with on
a case-by-case basis, in a manner that seems appropriate at the time. Since the
decisional situation has never been encountered before, it would seem that each
decision requires a process that would in many respects be unique compared with
other decision processes. However, the findings of their study revealed that most
organisations actually go through very similar processes when dealing with new
decisional situations. The type of decisions that this model considers could range from
the purchase of new equipment, the merger with another organisation or the
appointment of personnel, to any other decision that does not reflect the routine
operation of the organisation. The problems dealt with were typically important to the
organisation". Decisions relating to minor and trivial choices are not addressed in this
model. This form of decision making pertains to questions, which in some way or
another are intimately linked to the continuance of the organisation". From the study
4 Mintzberg 1976: 246
51976
6 Mintzberg 1976: 246
71976
8 Mintzberg 1976: 246
9 As an ex post facto exercise, the model of Mintzberg (1976) allows one to reconstruct a prior
organisational decision making process, even if the resulting decision was trivial and inconsequential
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of twenty-five strategic decisions in different organisations, Mintzberg'" distilled an
underlying model or schematic of the decision behaviour of organisations faced with
major decisions. The model indicated that decisions consist of three distinct phases.
Firstly, there is a phase of recognition, during which the problem becomes known, in
some way or another, to the organisation. This phase is called the 'identification
phase'. Thereafter, alternatives are generated and viable ways to solve the problem are
analysed. This is known as the 'development phase'. Lastly, organisations go through
the process of making the actual selection for a course of action. This phase is known
as the 'selection phase' 11. Mintzberg drew on a number of authors for the model'? 13.
The model is graphically depicted (Figure 2) on page 36.
within the framework of broader organisational objectives. Of the four models of decision making, only
the rational and procedural models allow for reconstruction of decision making processes. The other
two models are more concerned with the characterisation of decision making than with the unpacking
of a decision making system.
101976
IIMintzberg 1976: 252
121976: 251- 252
13 In the derivation of this model, Mintzberg (1976) are indebted to a number of authors who have
given them the basic conceptual tools, with which to look at organisational decision making. The most
noteworthy of these authors include John Dewey (1910), Simon (1965) and Witte (1972). Mintzberg's
(1976) work takes its greatest input from Herbert Simon. Each author offered in isolation a basic
component for the model. In particular, they identified the various distinct phases, but did not combine
them into a meaningful model, which would describe and adequately account for generic or systemic
behaviour in the organisational decision making process.
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Figure 2 Adapted from Mintzberg 1976
Identification - Decision Recognition
In any decisional situation an organisation needs to delineate the problem. For an
organisation to realise that it has a problem, it needs to have the appropriate sensory
apparatus. The sensory apparatus allows the organisation to detect an incongruous
event in its environment. Situations may exist where organisations ostensibly have
problems requiring attention, however, do not have the capacity to rectify the
problems. Similarly, cases exist where organisations have particular problems but do
not have the necessary sensory apparatus to detect them, and consequently only face
the problems at a stage when it may be too late. For Mintzberg, the capacity to
recognise a problem can be reduced to an occasion for acting upon a stimulus, which
may be the result of perceiving either a problem or an opportunity'".
The stimulus may be one where the organisation is not able to function in the
expected manner and thus needs to rectify the situation, i.e. a problem. Alternately, it
may come across an occurrence in its environment, which suggests a manner in which
the organisation can improve or expand what it does, i.e. an opportunity. Mintzberg"
141976: 253
15 1976
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mention further instances for action when occasions arrive, where the information
flow, either in nature or content or both is ambiguous. Typically, this leads to a state
of organisational indecision. It is not so much that the organisation is not able to make
a decision, it is more a case that it does not know what it is dealing with, i.e. the
organisation is not able to categorise with any certainty the experience and does not
know how to interpret it. The organisation may find itself in an ambiguous
environment or may be uncertain as to the nature of the organisational experience.
The study of ambiguity and uncertainty in decision making theory helps to explain
what decision making is all about. Let us therefore devote a little more attention to
this organisational predicament. Sayles'? and Mintzberg'Ï state that the identification
of a problem or an opportunity is usually not a simple process of pure recognition, but
is rather ambiguous in nature'". This is primarily so because of the way organisations
and individuals receive information. Organisational experience, from which
information is extracted, does not flow in systematic patterns geared towards easy
interpretation, but rather comes in streams that need to be appropriately deciphered 19.
One of the ways to understand the organisational activity of interpreting and
deciphering experience is by making use of Karl Weick's2o definition of sense
making" as developed during the 1990's. Interpreting a cue in the organisational
environment, which requires a reaction of sorts, necessitates sense making to take
place. Sense making takes place when there is either ambiguity or uncertainty at
play22.
"In the case of ambiguity, people engage in sense making because they are confused
by too many interpretations=P. The organisation does not know how to interpret on a
predictable basis the event or the disruption of its flow of experience or the flow of
information that it receives. Organisations, if considered as decision making entities,
161964
171973
18 InMintzberg 1976: 253
19 Reported in Mintzberg 1976: 253
201995
21 In addition, an explanation of Weick's sense making will be very useful for the understanding of the
anarchic model in Chapter 5.
22 Weick 1995: 91
23 Weick 1995: 91
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are, III cases of ambiguity, not able to 'place' the event(s). In other words,
organisations do not then understand what they are doing or what they are
experiencing. The events do not fit into any particular frame of reference. " ... [I]n the
case of uncertainty, they do so [make sense] because they are ignorant of
interpretations=". In this case, organisations are able to understand occurrences,
however, they lack appropriate information for the interpretation of the occurrence.
Thus, organisations react to their environment either through bewilderment (i.e. a case
of ambiguity) or by deciding to uncover the true nature of a problem (i.e. a case of
uncertainty). In this latter case, organisations need to merely engage in a systematic
process of discovery that assists in the comprehension of uncertain occurrences. Once
the veil of uncertainty has been lifted, a decision can be made.
In cases of ambiguity, no amount of interpretation will necessarily deliver the
appropriate response. Ambiguous events are per definition unclear. The reason for
lack of understanding is typically systemic rather than a lack of knowledge of how an
organisational experience may be interpreted. Ambiguous events may be so for a
number of reasons. Amongst them are that the "nature of the problem .. .itself is in
question; information is problematic; multiple, conflicting interpretations; different
value orientations, political/emotional clashes; goals are unclear, multiple or
conflicting; time, money, or attention are lacking; contradictions and paradoxes
appear; roles are vague, responsibilities are unclear; success measures are lacking;
poor understanding of the cause-effect relationships; symbols and metaphors [are]
used; [and] participation in decision-making [is] fluid,,25. In cases of ambiguity, the
organisation lacks the hermeneutic tools. The organisation is not able to cognitively
understand what it is dealing with. Cases of ambiguity can become hugely
problematic for organisations, for the simple reason that ambiguity does not suggest a
lack of understanding to which the mere addition of information would serve as a
resolution, but is rather so, because adding more information is not able to resolve the
problem of understanding'". The resolution of ambiguity lies in addressing the
structural issues that underlie the ambiguous event.
24 Weick 1995: 91
25 McCaskey 1982 reported inWeick 1995: 93
26 Weick 1995: 92
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This still leaves the decision maker with no clear mechanism for resolving the
ambiguous information flows. Ambiguity is only really resolved through the active
construction and bracketing of experience in appropriate categories of thought.
Mintzberg" do not suggest any specific treatment of the problem of ambiguity.
Decision making theory at the time of Mintzberg28 did not treat ambiguity in the
manner that Weick would have done. Decision making theory at the time was rather
concerned with rational decision making. Within the paradigm of rational decision
making the notion of ambiguity is a misnomer and is rather approximated to
uncertainty than being considered a problematic instance per se, which does not
necessarily fit into any clear conceptual model.
In cases of uncertainty, on the other hand, organisations merely have to 'add' more
information to what they are doing, until they reach the appropriate interpretation or
understanding of the disruptive evenr'". Stinchcombe'" states that uncertainty "is
reduced through news ... the residual uncertainty is transformed into risk and people
make their bets'r". The essence of uncertainty is a lack of information. Throughout
the Mintzberg'f model it should become clear that the iterative decision making
process that is undertaken, is in actual fact an instance of continual addition of
information. This continual addition of information serves as a clarifying process,
which ultimately results in putatively the correct decision.
Identification - Diagnosis
Once organisations have come to the realisation that they are in a problematic
situation, which is of a strategic nature and which requires decisional action of some
sort, they engage in situational diagnosis. In problematic cases, the authors found that
there typically existed a continuum of responses. Organisations chose to deal with
some problems in very structured and systematic ways, such as establishing
committees or following a particular protocol. At the other extreme, organisations
27 1976
28 1976
29 In this context, a disruptive event denotes an interruption in the flow of experience or an event that
causes uncertainty. It is not meant to necessarily have a positive or negative connotation.
301990
31 In Weick 1995: 96
32 1976
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chose to deal with other problems in a largely informal manner'", There may be a
good reason for the level of formality at which problematic situations are identified
and diagnosed. Problems of strategic concern usually relate to the survival of the
organisation and hence the heightened level of attention and formality. In cases where
the stimulus in the environment is actually a cue for opportunity, the diagnosis of the
opportunistic situation is not treated as a threat to the organisation, and hence the
urgency and formality of organisational process is not required". Arguably, one
would expect such organisational behaviour. Organisations would in all likelihood be
more concerned with that which could undermine their survival than that which is an
added benefit or 'nice to have'.
The 'diagnosis' process can be understood as a continuation of the initial recognition
process. However, in the diagnosis process, greater clarity is gained about the
problem at hand. It may well be that in this stage of the identification process the true
nature of the problem becomes known - it being either of an uncertain nature or an
ambiguous nature. Once a reasonable degree of clarity has been achieved as to what
confronts the organisation, the 'development phase,35 can begin. The development
phase is primarily concerned with the development of suitable alternatives that would
give resolution to the problem or opportunity.
The Development Phase
In this phase of the decision making process, there are two possible paths that an
organisation can take to suitably resolve a problem. The development phase consists
of the 'search routine' and the 'design routine'"'. Both routines intend to deliver a
solution to the problem, however the approach of either is different. An organisation
may institute one or both of these routines. These routines are used for the generation
of appropriate courses of action that will resolve the problem or alternately allow for
the exploitation of an opportunity.
33 Mintzberg 1976: 254
34 Mintzberg 1976: 254
35 Mintzberg 1976: 255
36 Mintzberg 1976: 255
40
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The search routine is primarily concerned with finding an appropriate solution by
making use of a previous solutiorr". The solution is, typically, the modification of
some other prior organisational artefact. Organisations deal with a variety of problems
in the course of their existence. Some of their past solutions can be tailored to
problems that are encountered at some point in the future. The search routine is so
called, because organisations go about searching the stock of organisational
knowledge both internally and externally for a similar problem and solution set. 38
Mintzberg'" identified four ways in which the search routine can be satisfied. Firstly,
organisations can search their own organisational memory for previous experiences''".
Organisations can match past experiences with their present needs. Organisations may
previously have had sufficiently similar experiences, the solutions of which might
well adequately resolve the problem at hand. Secondly, organisations may make use
of a 'passive search" 42. Passive search is an approach where the organisation
chooses to do nothing about the problem and hopes that a solution will come to it.
This inactivity may sound strange, however, it could nevertheless be a viable course
of action. Sometimes organisations do face situations where the best course of action
may be to do nothing and rather to wait and see how events unfold. The procession of
time may just present the right solution. Thirdly, a 'trap search,43 may be undertaken,
37 Mintzberg 1976: 255
38 Today, the search activity enjoys a lot of attention in management literature. The approach today,
given the high levels of organisational knowledge, is to find appropriate or efficient ways in which
organisations can adequately internalise their stocks of knowledge for future use. Arguable, this may
explain the management obsession with knowledge management, information management, knowledge
strategies and so on. However, it must be borne in mind that 'knowledge' in organisations was
previously understood in fundamentally different terms from today. The knowledge considered in the
models of decision making in this thesis, is more concerned with information and the transfer thereof
than with knowledge per se (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995: 49). The knowledge / information in these
models is of the type that can be expressed in data or information residing in organisational files and
databases. Today, it is generally acknowledged that knowledge denotes the interpretation of
information in particular contexts. Evidently, the way we understand knowledge has changed a lot over
the last few decades.
391976
40 Mintzberg 1976: 255
41 Cyert & March 1963
42 In Mintzberg 1976: 255
43 Soelberg 1967
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where groupings external to the organisation are informed of the problem in the hope
that they would be able to present a possible solution. The organisation thus not only
broadens its search field, but also employs more resources in the generation of a
solution. Participants external to the organisation are recruited in the hope that they
may well be able to deliver a solution. The last approach is an 'active search,44. An
active search is a concerted effort to find a solution by actively searching the
applicable areas that may deliver the solution. In the event that the search routine does
not deliver an appropriate solution, organisations undertake the design routine.
The design routine is the process undertaken to generate custom made solutions for a
problem. If an organisation is not able to find a suitable solution in its universe of
prior experience, then it may either ignore the problem and hope that it goes away or
alternately tailor a suitable solution. The process of tailoring a solution is not always
very clear. Organisations know what they ideally would like to achieve, however, are
not entirely sure how to go about achieving their desired outcome". The mechanisms
for designing a solution and what should constitute it are not always apparent. The
design routine lends itself to being an iterative process, whereby organisations go
through a circular process of refinement". The solution is tailored and modified until
such stage that it satisfies the criteria against which it is to be measured. 47A variation
of the basic design routine (i.e. to generate a solution from, as it were, scratch) is to
take a search routine solution and modify it to suit a particular problem. If a search
solution were to be treated in such a manner, then Mintzberg'" would consider it to be
part of the design routine rather than the search routine.
The development process comprising the search and design routines can take place in
various combinations. Organisations may initially, when confronted with a problem,
search in some form or another their internal or external environment. If unsuccessful
they may custom make a solution. The customisation process is typically iterative and
44 Mintzberg 1976: 255
45 Mintzberg 1976: 256
46 Mintzberg 1976: 256
47 This methodology should serve as a reminder of the rational model, which also undertakes a similar
process to match solutions with desired outcomes. There are distinct similarities between the
procedural model and the rational model.
48 1976
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there is no reason why during this iterative process the organisation cannot continue
to search its environment for an appropriate solution, which may have been
overlooked in the previous search cycle. In the end, however, either through search or
design or both, the organisation produces a solution or a series of solutions. At this
point, the decision making process enters the 'selection pbase'".
The Selection Phase
The selection phase is concerned with choosing the most appropriate solution that will
satisfy one or a series of organisational problems. Logically, it is the final process in
the model or organisational decision making process'". The selection phase is
primarily concerned with three processes. The first is a 'screening routine'<'. Once a
series of organisational artefacts have passed the screening routine they are evaluated
by some means or other in the 'evaluation-choice routine' 52, the most appropriate
decision of which is then enacted in the 'authorization routine'V. Before looking at
the three routines in greater detail one needs to be cognisant of the fact that the
selection phase is not always logically positioned after the development phase. We
shall address this question in greater detail, once we have covered the main aspects of
the selection phase.
Once an organisation has developed a series of alternatives from the results of the
search routine, then a screening routine is initiated.". A screening routine is an
intensive evaluation of a proposed solution. It is used to evaluate solutions that have
been tailored from other pre-existing solutions within the organisation's experience
and knowledge. A solution is tested with the purpose of establishing whether a prior
solution, modified to solve a new set of specifications, is in actual fact appropriate.
The idea of screening, i.e. scrutinising a possible decision, is not new to decision
making science. Organisational studies by Cyert and March55 found that organisations
screen various artefacts for inappropriateness, rather than appropriateness. In other
49 Mintzberg 1976: 256
50 Mintzberg 1976: 256
51 Mintzberg 1976: 257
52 Mintzberg 1976: 258
53 Mintzberg 1976: 259
54 Mintzberg 1976: 257
55 1965
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words, a negative test is used by which the ostensibly undesirable is rejected'".
Mintzberg notes that the screen routine is in actual fact not an intensive evaluation of
the various decision possibilities, but is rather a mechanism for the elimination of
inappropriate or unfeasible solutions+'. In this respect, the findings of Mintzberg " are
consistent with Cyert and March59. Cyert and March, however, do suggest that
screening takes place on the basis of loosely defined criteria or rather broadly
formulated expectations'".
According to the model of Mintzberg'", no screemng routine follows solutions
generated in the design routine. The reason for this is that the designed solutions
already have the assumptions of the problem implicitly built in. Arguably, when
designing a solution, the designer is mindful of what needs to be achieved. In the case
of a search solution the designer would also be mindful of what needs to be achieved,
but creating a solution out of prior organisational artefacts may not necessarily deliver
the intended result. The design routine thus has its own built in screening mechanism.
The solutions designed for a specific problem are problem-specific. They are not
coincidentally appropriate as the solutions from a search routine may be.
The evaluation-choice routine is the process whereby the organisation engages in
making the actual decision. Simply put, the organisation decides on a course of action.
The study by Mintzberg'f identifies three ways in which this routine is undertaken.
Organisations make an actual decision by means of 'judgement-evaluation',
'bargaining-evaluation' or 'analysis-evaluation'P'.
The judgement-evaluation approach is cited as being the most popular and also easiest
to apply to a decisional situation. It is a quick form of decision making and is not
necessarily backed by any rational or systematic process'". Furthermore, only one
561965: 79
571976: 257
58 1976
59 1965
60 Cyert and March 1965: 79
61 1976
621976
63 Mintzberg 1976: 258
64 Mintzberg 1976: 258
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person typically undertakes the judgement-evaluation'". 66 The process is not
systematic and accounting for such decision making to others may be problematic'",
In the event that more than one person is burdened with the decision making
responsibility or in cases where there are a number of persons and / or organisations
involved in the decision making process, a decisional situation may be resolved
through the bargaining-evaluation approach. In the case of the bargaining-evaluation
approach, "selection is made by a group of decision makers with conflicting goal
systems, each exercising judgement't'". The bargaining approach is a mere duplication
of the judgement-evaluation approach; it, however, comprises a number of agents
exercising their judgements. The political model (which follows this chapter) is
concerned with resolving problems in which value judgements need to be made. The
bargaining-evaluation approach is actually a case of political decision making.
The last manner in which decisional situations are settled is through careful analysis.
This approach is known as the analysis-evaluation. This approach is a product of
rational decision making and requires that the entire decisional situation be measured
in some way or another, and then evaluated against a set of criteria. If the proposed
solution is found to satisfy the criteria then a decision can be made. In practice,
Mintzberg'" found that technocrats would undertake the analysis of the problem and
solution and would produce a factual finding, i.e. one based on a set of very
descriptive and quantifiable factors, whereupon management would make a
judgement-evaluation or bargaining-evaluation type decision" 71. The actual decision
is made in an autonomous or political manner and very rarely on the basis of pure
scientific reason. The approach of analysis-evaluation was found in practice to be
65 Mintzberg 1976: 258
66 If decision making is left to the individual to decide, then, presumably, a judgement-evaluation is
based on experience and insight about a particular problem and about what may intuitively feel right
and is not necessarily based on factual and analytical data.
67 Mintzberg 1976: 258
68 Mintzberg 1976: 258
69 1976
701976: 258
71 This is also indicated on the schematic (Figure 2) on page 36.
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least used by organisational decision makers; rather they seemed to make decisions in
a judgement or bargaining manner".
In the procedural decision making model, strategic questions are typically resolved
either through bargaining or judgement. The reason for this is that strategic questions
are not necessarily the result of an analytical process, but rather the reaction to
environmental concerns both internal and external to the organisation, which need to
be acted upon. Questions such as whether to change a corporate budget or to invest in
a particular project, are not only the resultant of quantitative study, but rather involve
other factors too. " ... [T]he evaluation-choice routine is in practice a crude one. A
plethora of value and factual issues, few of them concrete, many involving emotions,
politics, power and personality must be considered... the evaluation-choice routine
gets distorted, both by cognitive limitations, that is, by information overload, and by
unintended as well as intended biases. This has been found to apply to all modes of
selection, including analysis'v ', From the outset, the model of procedural decision
making seems most rational in nature, however, the mechanism for decision making
seems to undermine the rationality thereof.
The last aspect of the selection phase consists of the authorisation routine.
Authorisation is only applicable in decisional situations, where the decision itself
requires approval by persons higher up the organisational hierarchy". The study
found that a solution or proposed set of decisions were typically delivered in their
entirety for authorisation. A particular problem would not go through an iterative
authorisation process, whereby various parts of a solution were presented for
approval, but rather a complete solution was presented for approval". The approach
taken by the authorising person or group is also typically of a judgement-evaluation
nature. A decision would be accepted or rejected on the basis of time and information
constraints. Furthermore, the study found that typically authorisation procedures
rejected or accepted a particular solution in its entirety". In the event of rejection, the
solution was abandoned and a new one sought or suitably modified, before being
72 Mintzberg 1976: 258
73 Mintzberg 1976: 259
74 Mintzberg 1976: 259
75 Mintzberg 1976: 260
76 Mintzberg 1976: 260
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The procedural model of decision making suggests that organisations go through three
very distinct phases before a decision process is complete. The decision process,
however, does not always proceed as smoothly as the model suggests. The decision
making process is in actual fact regulated and facilitated by means of a number of
supporting routines.
presented in its entirety. Once the authorisation routine has been completed, the
decision is enacted. This model does not suggest any insights as to how the outcomes
thereof may be understood or may be dealt with by the organisation. The model
further does not provide any insight on feedback loops that may exist between the
external environment and the organisational decision making process.
Supporting Routines
Mintzberg" identified a senes of supporting routines that facilitated procedural
decision making. These routines were: 'decision control routines', 'decision
communication routines' and 'political routines' 78. Each routine aids the decision
process by ensuring continuity and removing hindrances. All three can be further
analysed into sub-routines.
The decision control routine establishes the framework within which the decision
making process is to take place. The decision process, as such, is planned, i.e. how
will the process take place and what resources are to be allocated. This is known as
the meta-decision behind the actual decision making process and involves the
definition of the decision space and the parameters thereof". Mintzberg'" makes a
further distinction. In addition to the decision planning process, there is also a
'decision switching process' or routine'". This process is concerned with the transition
from one phase of the decision making process to another. For example, once the
solution development phase has been completed, the organisation or decision making
participants switch to evaluating their solutions. The switching process is primarily
concerned with determining the phase or process in the decisional process'". The
77 1976
78 Mintzberg 1976: 260
79 Mintzberg 1976: 260 - 261
80 1976
81 1976: 261
82 Mintzberg 1976: 261
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decision control routine provides guidance for the decision making process. It is the
meta-plan or map, by which the process is guided.
The decision communication routine is primarily concerned with satisfying the
informational needs of the decision making process. This covers both the information
inputs and outputsf". In order to fulfil this function, Mintzberg'" identified three
underlying routines. They are 'exploration', 'investigation' and 'dissemination'
routines'". The exploration routine is a passive routine, whereby information comes to
the organisation and those concerned with the decision process. This flow of
information is usually used to initially define the problem and the decision space'".
This flow of information provides the impetus, on the basis of which further
investigation takes place. The investigation routine is used for locating specific
information'". It is used in diagnosing a problem and developing a solution. Once a
problem has been diagnosed, specific information, used for further understanding is
gathered, upon which a solution may be developed or searched for. The search
activity for solution building is in itself also a case of information investigation. The
last information process used in the communication routine, is the dissemination
routine. This routine is concerned with the distribution of information. The study of
Mintzberg found that dissemination became increasingly important the more people
were involved in the decision making process'", The dissemination function is both
the feedback mechanism whereby persons involved in the decision making process
receive information about their actions and the channel by which new information is
disseminated. The dissemination routine distributes both the information that resulted
from the exploration and investigation routines as well as new information that has
been created throughout the decision making process.
The last supporting routine that helps to maintain continuity in the decision making
process is the political routine. The political decision making mode, solves situations,
which are not easily resolved according to rational criteria. Mintzberg found that
83 Mintzberg 1976: 260 261
84 1976
85 Mintzberg 1976: 261
86 Mintzberg 1976: 261
87 Mintzberg 1976: 261
88 1976: 262
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bargaining was the manner in which the political routine was exercised'". In
particular, the political routine serves to "clarify power relations ... bring about
consensus '" [and] mobilize the forces for the implementation of decisions't'". The
political routine lubricates the procedural decision making system, by providing
necessary intervention in processes that may have ground to a halt or where
unexpected decisions are required. It must be borne in mind that the procedural model
may actually consist of a number of minor sub-decisions. The goal of arriving at a
particular decision is a dynamic process and may require a series of minor decisions,
which in themselves are typically also the result of decision processes, which consist
of identifying minor problems, generating alternatives and then selecting the
appropriate possibilities. The political routine performs numerous functions, including
assisting with the definition of the problem in the diagnosis phase, ironing out
problems in the derivation of a solution during the development phase, and helping set
the stage for the selection phase.
This concludes the discussion of Mintzberg's" model. A number of interesting
developments followed the publication of this model and will now be briefly
considered.
Further Developments
In 1984 Paul Nutt, introduced his variation on the Mintzberg'" model. His intention
was to elaborate on and to investigate the finer details of procedural decision making,
by looking at a sample of seventy-eight (as opposed to the twenty-five of
Mintzberg'") service organisations'". His finding was that decision making processes
consisted of five stages".
Organisations went through a process of, firstly, formulating the problem'". This is
done to understand the problem and to set the objectives that are to be met by
891976: 262
90 Mintzberg 1976: 262
91 1976
921976
93 1976
94 Nutt 1984: 414
95 Nutt 1984: 416
96Nutt 1984: 416
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resolving the problem. Secondly, possible alternatives / solutions to the problem are
generated'". Thereafter, the decision making process enters a third stage, during which
possible solutions are analysed, refined and tested'". Once the alternatives have been
adequately refined, they are evaluated in the fourth stage'". This evaluation
determines the relative merits and benefits of each alternative. Upon completion of
the evaluation, the appropriate solution is selected and implemented in the final
stagelOO• In addition, each stage of the decision making process is subject to a number
of routines or steps. These steps include three activities, viz. 'search', 'synthesis' and
'analysis"?'. These steps assist in improving the quality of the output of each stage.
The search step fulfils an information gathering and distribution function. The
synthesis step assists in the development of ideas or alternatives in each stage. Lastly,
the analysis step refines and prioritises the output of each stage.
The following schematic (Figure 3) illustrates the model.
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5
Nutt's Model of Procedural Decision Making
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Figure 3 Based on Nutt 1984
97Nutt 1984: 416
98 Nutt 1984: 416
99Nutt 1984: 416
IOONutt1984: 416
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Subsequent to Nutt'sl02 model, no further models of procedural decision making were
published. However, a number of authors did examine in greater detail the individual
stages of procedural decision making.
Lyles and Mitroff'°3 examined the question of organisational problem formulation.
They primarily looked at how organisations became aware of a problem and what
process was undertaken to formulate the problem. Problems were largely identified
through "informal sensing techniques" and not always formally recognised by the
organisation 104. Since formal reporting systems in organisations failed to report
problems, organisational participants were required to articulate perceived problems.
In addition, Lyles and Mitroff found that in formulating common problems
organisations typically made use of familiar methods of enquiry and investigation'l".
However, in cases where the problem was ill-defined the organisation typically lacked
the apparatus or techniques to formulate such problems'?". A similar study, which
investigated problem finding was also undertaken by Gerald Smith107.
Other aspects of the decision making process, such as the diagnosis of strategic issues,
was investigated by Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan'l" 109.Their paper describes the
nature of strategic issues and how such issues are diagnosed in the organisation. Their
central thesis is that the inputs of a diagnostic process determine to a large extent the
range of strategic alternatives available to an organisation'I". To this end, they
developed a framework that consists of an "input-process-output model of smlll".
The inputs to this model were the "cognitive maps" which participants used for
understanding the problem, the political interests of participants and the related
102 1984
103 1980
104 Lyles and Mitroff 1980: 116
105 1980: 116
106 Lyles and Mitroff 1980: 116
107 1989
108 1983
109 Hereinafter 'Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan 1983' will be referred to as 'Dutton 1983'.
110 Dutton 1983: 320
III Strategic Issue Diagnosis
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problem or issue. The rmxmg of these elements determined the viable strategic
altematives'P.
Ernst Alexander'{' investigated a further stage of the decision making process. His
analysis focused on the design and derivation of alternatives in the decision making
process. To this end he developed a conceptual model that considered the impact of
'creativity', 'search activity' and 'closure of the problem' in the design process'!". An
interesting conclusion from his study, and one which certainly enhances our
understanding of procedural decision making, was that alternatives were generated
primarily through search and / or discovery processes and that organisations were not
particularly creative or innovative in designing solutionsl".
Apart from the investigations of the different stages of decision making, further
developments of the procedural model constituted insights on how the procedural
model may be reconciled with other models of decision making.
112Dutton 1983: 320
1131979
114 Alexander 1979: 382
us Alexander 1979: 402
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CHAPTER4
THE POLITICAL MODEL 1
This chapter is concerned with the description and discussion of the political model of
organisational decision making. In this chapter, the nature of political decision
making shall be investigated by examining the historical context from which the
model of political decision making originated. Thereafter, the characteristics of
political decision making shall be discussed. Lastly, brief consideration shall be given
to the development and applications of the model.
The model of political decision making is historically rooted in the Cuban Missile
Crisis of the 1960's. Graham Allison's 2 3 study thereof uncovered a form of decision
making, which had previously not attracted much attention by organisational decision
making theorists. Although this model is based on the behaviour of political
institutions, the application thereof to other organisations is not limited to traditional
political establishments. The generic manner of decision making described by this
model is present in organisations that do not characteristically conduct themselves in a
political manner, but in which organisational participants are able to observe the
"'wheeling and dealing' through which different people attempt to advance specific
interests'" .
Political decision making is principally concerned with resolving normative
situations. Normative situations are typically decided not on the basis of an optimal
course of action, but rather through the exercise of value judgements. A particular
problem would be resolved by choosing the 'appropriate' or 'morally acceptable' or
I The first part of this chapter will draw primarily on Allison's (1971) derivation of the model of
political decision making. Allison identifies a number of characteristics common to political decision
making, however, he gives limited treatment to each. To fill this gap we shall make use of Morgan's
(1997) analysis of political decision making. His unpacking of the characteristics is much more
extensive and informative.
2 1971
3 Allison wrote a very interesting and entertaining account of one of the tensest political situations ever.
His "Essence of Decision" is worth reading for the interesting insights on the Cuban Missile Crisis.
4 Morgan 1997: 154
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'justifiable' course of action. 5 This model describes a decision making system, which
would allow for the exercise of preference, which is not bound by a particular system
of pre-conditioned or the lack of preferences, but is rather determined by normative
consideration. Political decision making focuses on the decision making of
individuals and coalitions". (This may seem to 'clash' with the focus of this analysis,
but we shall make the model relevant by generalising from individual to 'generic
subjective'? 8 behaviour.)
In the absence of a decision making system or clear and guiding preferences, 'policy'
is aimed at guiding organisations in areas, where only 'appropriate' action is possible.
Policy becomes meaningful in situations, which are not resolved by predetermined
answers". Policy serves as the yardstick by which outcomes are measured. In a
situation, for example, such as the alleviation of poverty, there are countless ways of
potentially resolving the problem. In an attempt to resolve the problem, decision
making consistent with the policy on poverty alleviation should take place. The
outcome of the decision process is then evaluated against the policy. This still leaves
the organisation with a decision making dilemma. The organisation does not have a
means of choosing the appropriate course of action.
5 As an illustration, governments annually face the question of how taxes should be spent. It would be
very difficult for any individual or institution to arrive at the optimal solution. Rather governments
spend the taxes in a negotiated manner on the basis of what may or may not be appropriate. In other
words, there are no definitive answers as to how government should go about its finances, but is rather
bound by what it is able to justify.
6 This concept will be defined and examined in greater detail under the characterisation of political
decision making
7 The 'generic subjective' is a term used by Weick (originally by Wiley 1988). This term describes
individual or group behaviour in organisations in a generic sense. In other words, the individual traits
are removed and the person is understood in relational and role performance terms. Thus, persons
would 'cease' to be persons and rather be generic enactors of roles, participants in networks and
relationships. Using such an approach, we can begin to speak of the constituents of generic
organisational behaviour, where the individual is not addressed, but rather the role, position and
purpose of the organisational participant is. Such an approach allows for the uncovering of systemic
properties.
8 Weick 1995: 70
9 Allison 1971: 154
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Before looking at the characteristics of political decision, an examination of the
historical context and origin of the model is called for.
Taking a Cue from Political Decision Making in the 1960's 10
The Cuban Missile Crisis brought the USA and the then USSR to the brink of nuclear
confrontation. Never before in history had the USA and the USSR (or any other two
nations) come that close to engaging in nuclear war.
In 1962 the USSR under the leadership of Khrushchev placed nuclear missiles on the
island of Cuba. Further naval shipments from the USSR to Cuba took place. The USA
decided to respond to the escalating threat with a naval blockade of the Soviet vessels.
The blockade proved to be successful and the missiles were withdrawn. Escalation of
this standoff between the two nations would have resulted in a form of national
suicide. The casualties in USA, USSR and Europe, estimated at 200 million, would
have exceeded the casualties of both World War 1 and 2.
In the light of the dire implications, which were most certainly known to both
Kennedy and Khrushchev, this event, viewed from the perspective of the foreign
policy of both the USA and the USSR, seemed very odd and inconsistent!'. The
actions chosen by each nation did not further their foreign policy goals of mutual
improvement of international relations. In an attempt to understand the crisis, Allison
articulated a number of questions, which indicated the anomalous nature of Soviet and
American actions, viz. "[w]hy did the Soviet Union place strategic offensive missiles
in Cuba? ... Why did the United States respond with a naval quarantine of Soviet
shipments to Cuba? ... Why were the missiles withdrawn?,,!2 At the time, the answer
to these questions may have given insight as to the mutual divergence of foreign
policy. Up to the present no systematic model of decision making could account for
the strange governmental behaviour. Attempting to answer these questions, Graham
Allison analysed the decision making processes through two different lenses. His first
analysis examined the behaviour of both the USA and USSR through the lens of the
rational model. He found the results thereof to be largely unsatisfactory.
10 This section looks at Allison's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The historical details of the
Cuban Missile Crisis are not directly relevant to the discussion of the political model of decision
making and will not be looked at in any particular detail.
IlAllison 1971: 1 - 2
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Rational decision making in such a situation would be geared towards maximising the
foreign policy goals of each government, through the means that have the lowest cost
or impact implications. By virtue of the systematic and calculative nature of rational
decision making the analyst is able to determine the appropriate course of action, for
both the USA and USSR. Either party to the conflict is able to determine reliably what
the best course of action may be with respect to his opponent. The rational model
allows the analyst or the decision maker the luxury of placing himself / herself in the
position of the opposing party, i.e. the enemy from either perspective. Wohlstetter
describes such a process" ... that attempts to introduce the enemy by letting him, in his
best interest, do his worst to our forces and then seeing which of our forces
accomplishes the job most effectively in the face of this best enemy attempt't':'. In this
case, each government would try to anticipate what the other was about to do and then
act (provided that government and its foreign policy arms are rational actors and do so
in a consistent manner) according to that which would result in the maximisation of
its national and foreign policy goals'".
Within the framework of rational decision making such a model could not account for
the Kennedy decision of a naval blockade and neither for Khrushchev's withdrawal
from the Caribbean. A naval blockade did not in any way relate to the threat of
nuclear missiles on Cuba and did not change the foregoing state of affairs, but rather
indicated the seriousness with which the US viewed Soviet action. Nor did it
necessarily force the USSR to dismantle its missile installations. This course of action
was a stalling tactic'' to a crisis that could potentially spiral out of control. The
rational model does not seem to be able to adequately explain the series of choices,
which both sides made. Incidentally, the USA achieved the desired outcome from the
blockade, however, seen and analysed from a rational perspective a series of other
equally ifnot more plausible outcomes could have been possible.
121971:1-2
13 1964 quoted in Allison 1971: 18
l~he term 'goal' will be used in connection with the term 'issue'. Our understanding of these terms
will be as follows: for each goal that is to be achieved in a political decision making situation, there is
an underlying issue that needs to be addressed. The goal is the objective that relates to the resolution of
the issue. For example, groups that would like to achieve a particular goal, lobby an underlying issue.
15 Allison 1971: 61
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The inadequacy of a rational explanation for the course of events led Graham Allison
to consider a different approach towards decision making. In this approach
government to the outsider may seem like a unitary institution, which exercises its
foreign policy in a consistent and predictable manner. To the insider, however,
government is a black box that covers many gears and levers'". An institution such as
government, as is the case with the USA, is vast and covers countless agencies and
arms, each of which typically exhibits a life of its own. It is through these agencies
and loosely bound institutions that government exercises policy including foreign
policy. Due to the broad scope and reach of government, policy processes and
decision making processes differ within such an institution.
Viewing the Cuban Missile Crisis through the lens of a fragmented organisation,
where semi-autonomous decision making takes place at different points and levels the
following remarks can be made. Government perceives its environment through
various sensory organs. Government is a fragmented organisation. The fragments and
divisions deal with particular problems. These problems or situations are usually of a
repetitive nature, and thus standard operating procedures are devised. Standard
operating procedures are not particularly well suited to changing environments or
non-sensible occurrences. Problems or situations are addressed in manners, which are
usually semi-independent from other areas of government. In some cases, problems
do exist, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, which exceed the jurisdiction of any
particular division of government and requires the output of various governmental
departments. These departments, however, normally function reasonably
independently of one another!". H... [G]overnment behavior relevant to any important
problem reflects the independent output of several organizations, partially coordinated
by government leaders. Government leaders can substantially disturb, but not
substantially control, the behavior of these organisations't'", Sorensen'Ïobserves that,
H[p]residents rarely, if ever, make decisions - particularly in foreign affairs - in the
16 Allison 1971: 5 - 6
17 Allison 1971: 67
18 Allison 1971: 67
19 Theodore Sorenson was at the time of the crisis on the Special Council of President Kennedy and
was privy to the inner workings of the political process surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis.
57
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
sense of writing their conclusion on a clean slate ... the basic decisions, which confine
their choices, have all too often been previously made,,2o.
In the Cuban Missile Crisis the courses of action by the two governments were chiefly
determined by institutional constraints. These constraints determined to a large extent
the quality and timing of the information received and furthermore what available
military resources existed. These constraints were determined by the semi-
independent outputs of different arms of government contributing to a broader policy
goal. The following two examples should illustrate the foregoing. Firstly, in the case
of the USA, Kennedy received intelligence regarding missiles installations on Cuba at
an advanced stage of Soviet armament. Cuba was but one of twenty- five nations that
was being closely monitored by the USA21. This vastly limited the options that the
USA could exercise. Secondly, in the case of the USSR, the decision to place missiles
on Cuba resulted from a policy decision that aimed to build up strategic Soviet missile
capability. However, due to budgetary constraints, the only workable option was to
make use of present missile capability and place it in strategic positions'". In the
former case, the USA was bound by the slow internal operations of government and
in the latter case the USSR was bound by its previous decisions and actions.
For both Kennedy and Khrushchev, their decisions had to function in a predetermined
environment, with very little space for manoeuvrability. The analogy of a chessboard
could be used ". With the exception of the opening move in a chess game, your
options and opportunities for action are framed, limited and shaped by the preceding
moves. At various points in the game, your possible moves and strategies are limited
by your prior moves - you are bound by the history of the game.
This approach of Graham Allison could be likened to a definition of the parameters of
decision making in organisations. He conceives of a model, which is in actual fact a
series of constraining circumstances. For government, the moves that its departments
undertake are largely determined by their outputs. Government being usually a very
large and pluralistic organisation invariably struggles to maintain consistent goal
directed policies. This is due to the influences that its various semi-autonomous arms
20 1967
21 Allison 1971: 120
22 Allison 1971: 117
23 Allison 1971: 100
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have. The various aspects of government and its various agencies are not perfectly
aligned. Each arm or part of government has a particular functional specialisation that
treats and deals with particular problems. This severely influences and limits the
options that government as a whole has when faced with a crisis.
This approach, contrasting it with a rational approach, has a further dimension that
needs to be explained. For both the USA and USSR, the divergence from détente to
the exacerbation of hostile international relations is anomalous within the framework
of the rational model. The rational model is characterized by consistency and does not
easily explain the divergence of foreign policy by both the USA and USSR from their
earlier positions. In the case of the Graham Allison approach, such a divergence does
not need to be explained. The outcome of governmental decision making is merely the
product of foregoing constraining circumstances. Given the consequences of prior
governmental activity, decision making is determined by what is realistically
achievable. Decision making in such a model is explained by the built-in limitations
that each subsequent decision of government, through its various organs, creates for
future situations.
The major concern that is not resolved in the preceding discussion is that the prior
models and approaches to understanding government decision making do not account
for the leverage that political players or coalitions'" have on the apparatus of
government, i.e. the president and his / her advisors can interfere with the workings of
a particular department, in order to affect some policy directed goal. The discussion
thus far is not able to explain adequately the inner workings of groups of people who
ultimately determine the course of action taken by governments. The rational model is
not able to account for such behaviour either, except for cases where the dealings /
leverage of the players is consistent with the goals of the organisation. This dynamic
of this leverage will form the crux of our attempt to explain political decision making.
24 The term 'player(s)' and 'coalition(s)' are used to describe persons or coalitions within a political
decision making situation. These 'persons' and 'groupings' are the actual constituents and final
decision makers. These terms shall be used interchangeably and are meant to denote the various
competingentities involved in the pursuit of decision making in a political context.
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The Characteristics of Political Type Decision Making
At the outset one has to acknowledge that the political model of decision making is
not really a model (as is the case with rational, procedural or anarchic decision
making), in so far as it does not describe processes and features of a decision making
style, but is rather a set of characteristics or elements that are manifest in
environments where political decision making takes place. Decision making which
accords with the characteristics described in this section, could typically be labelled as
political decision making. The following two views give a good introduction to the
nature of political decision making.
"The "leaders" who sit on top of organizations are not a monolithic group. Rather,
each individual in this group is, in his own right, a player in a central competitive
game. The name of the game is politics ... ,,25.
"Since organizational goals and objectives are negotiated among the groups of
participants, it is unlikely that any allocation of resources will meet general
agreement. The divergence of goals and the contention for scarce resources make
organizational decision making inherently a political process?".
The political decision making model can be summed up as follows: The decision
making body of an organisation usually consists of a number of persons. These
persons engage in a decision making process, where the output of their decisions, i.e.
that which the organisation will deliver with respect to a particular situation, is based
on criteria deemed to be appropriate by their own estimation. But when the
organisation in question is government, "players ... act in terms of no consistent set of
strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national,
organizational, and personal goals ... make ... decisions not by a single, rational choice
but by the pulling and hauling that is politics'r". Within organisations, there are
decision-centres'". The outputs of these centres are not necessarily consistent with the
25Allison 1971: 144
26Choo 1998: 182
27Allison 1971: 144
28The term 'decision centre'shall denote the group of persons who contribute to the making of a
decision in an organisation. This includes persons who only offer input and are not necessarily the
decision makers themselves. The decision centre may constitute either a group of persons who advise a
single decision maker or alternately make decisions on the basis of consensus.
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stated or intended goals of the organisations. The organisational decision making
process and especially communication process can be viewed as a game. As in all
games, there are certain rules and constraints that participants have to adhere to. In an
organisation, such constraints could be chains of command, hierarchies, firewalls,
deadlines and so on. To be able to play the game, one must firstly be a player, and
then know the rules. Advantageous use of the organisation, through political
manipulation requires lobbying the correct issue or taking the appropriate approach to
a particular problem. The approach should ideally appeal to an audience within the
organisation that is able to best effect the desired goal. Furthermore, the mobilisation
of such a goal requires critical mass or sufficient support.
A number of salient characteristics of the political decision making process can now
be identified.
Decision Criteria
The first characteristic of political decision making is that the criteria against which a
decision is measured are arbitrary. Arbitrary criteria allow individuals to build into the
decision making process their own motivations and agendas. Using an example, the
judgment of a decision maker on an organisational issue may well be clouded, by his /
her own overriding personal considerations. The arbitrary criteria of such a decision
making process flow forth from the following characteristics
Goal Diversity
The second characteristic is concerned with a " ... diversity of goals and values that
must be reconciled before a decision can be reached'f". At any given time a number
of goals are promoted. These goals may not necessarily be congruent with one
another. The diversity of goals may also be formulated through the lens of 'interests'.
The interests of the individual within the decision making process determines to a
large extent the goals that he / she is prepared to pursue. Morgan formulates interests
as the " ... predispositions embracing goals, values, desires, expectations, and other
orientations and inclinations that lead a person to act in one way rather than
another'r'". The nature of these interests may differ for each player in the political
game and may be organised in various combinations according to the 'task', the
29 Allison 1971: 157
30 1997: 161
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'career' or the 'extramural'<'. In one case, the player's interests are aligned with the
organisation and with the functional requirements of the task that needs to be
perforrnedv. In another case, the player may make use of his I her role in the
organisation to further personal vocational aspirations':'. Lastly, the player may
represent interests, which are external to the purpose or functional orientation of the
organisatiorr'".
Closely related to the consideration of interests is that of the perspectives of the
players. The views that players take on an issue are crucial. The ways in which
different political players view a problem are functions of their own perhaps narrow
understandings thereof, and may even be framed by their interests. Different players
and coalitions would view what is ostensibly the same problem from different
perspectives and frames of reference, and would draw their own conclusions as to
what the optimal solution ought to be. Their point of view and solution are a function
of their perspective+', This line of reasoning can be taken further: the solutions that
are to be offered by the players are also functions of their positions in the
organisation. Thus, the position that a player occupies within an organisation can
shape the view that he I she has on the matter. This can bracket the problem and
solution in terms of the maximisation of his I her particular organisational interest,
which in turn is derived from the player's position in the organisation. The problem to
be dealt with may seem entirely different to the various players, specifically because
they look at it through the lens crafted by their own organisational positiorr'".
Divergent interests, perspectives and goals may become very problematic for
organisations and are intrinsic features of the political decision making process". The
complexity of the situation is exacerbated even further when there are multiple
players and coalitions that have divergent interests, perspectives and goals'". Goals
may be such that the satisfaction of one excludes the possibility of others, or that
31 Morgan 1997: 161
32 Morgan 1997: 161
33 Morgan 1997: 161
34 Morgan 1997: 161
35 Allison 1971: 178 & 250
36 Allison 1971: 178
37 Morgan 1997: 65
38 Morgan 1997: 163
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some are mutually achievable, but not all. Very rarely in political decision making can
all goals be satisfied. Political decision making allocates resources for the
achievement of particular goals, through a process of rigorous personal interaction
that does not necessarily rely on a set of objective criteria, but rather creates a
decision according to some or other personal preference function. Understanding the
interest orientations and perspectives behind goal formulation becomes paramount to
the analysis of political decision making situations.
Bargaining
The third characteristic of political decision making is concerned with a bargaining
game. The decision-centre is not a homogeneous group, but rather constitutes a
number of people who intend to have their interests represented in the best possible
manner. Each member strives to have his / her view of what may be best for the
organisation enacted. Trying to arrive at a desired end requires of each member in the
decision making group to negotiate, manipulate and trade-off against the other
members. Each member is required to look after his / her own / departmental interest,
whilst realising the broader organisational goals. Typically, the rules of a bargaining
process are determined within the organisation. Bargaining is determined by the
structural features of the organisation so well as the dominance and absence of
personalities. Hence, how players and coalitions position themselves, greatly
influences their bargaining positions'". Bargaining in organisations is, however, not
just limited to individuals. Coalitions can be formed.
Coalitions can be defined as " ... groups of individuals ... [who] ... cooperate in relation
to specific issues, events, or decisions or to advance specific values and ideologies't'",
When engaged in a bargaining process, coalition forming and coalition support may
confer a number of benefits on the various players. Firstly, they confer popular
support for the issue that is to be mobilised. Secondly, presence in numbers offers a
certain degree of strategic clout. Coalitions create bargaining groups, which in certain
cases may have a greater impact on decision making than an individual, mobilising
the same issue. Morgan remarks that coalition development is " ... a strategy for
39 Morgan 1997: 161
40 Morgan 1997: 166
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advancing one's interests in an organization, and organization members often give
considerable attention to increasing their power and influence through this means?".
The pursuit of politics and coalition formation is endemic to pluralistic
organisations'f. The formation of various coalitions and bargaining units within a
political decision making environment, results in each having " ... its own turf to guard
and power to protect. The result is a form of negotiation, sometimes covert,
sometimes overt, in which the various representatives attempt to advance the interests
of their sponsors by influencing problem definition and option formulation as well as
by having an impact on the final decision ...,,43. The various issues tabled for
discussion and decisions are represented by "competing clusters of people ... who are
identified with each of the alternative goals and policies?". In some cases, a singular
person may represent a particular issue, without having the support of anyone else.
The presence of clusters of people, give varying weights to the issues that are being
promoted. Different people or groups of people are associated with different issues.
Some issues may enjoy more popular support within the decision centre that others.
The presence of popular support does not mean that the issue can necessarily be
effectively mobilised. A coalition may think that a particular issue is important and
that it may have input on the decision process, but if the coalition is not able to
convince the decision makers of its position or is not able to influence the decision
process, then having a large number of supporters is merely incidental to the limited
attention that an issue will enjoy. A large support base here does not necessarily
translate into decision making power.
At the core of the bargaining game is conflict resolution. Bargaining strives to resolve
conflicting goals and interests. In this regard, Thomas has identified five different
ways in which such conflict resolution may take place: Firstly, players may 'avoid'
dealing with the issue or confronting players associated therewith45• Secondly, players
may negotiate or 'compromise' on the issue and corne to a meaningful understanding,
41 1997: 167
42 Morgan 1997: 204
43 Beach 1997: 125 - 126
44 Allison 1971: 157
45 Thomas 1976: 900
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which would offer an acceptable solution". Thirdly, players may 'compete' to such
an extent that the outcome of the contest is of a win-lose type nature'". Fourthly,
players may 'accommodate' one another and choose the course of action, which, on
merit, serves the organisation best". Lastly, players may 'collaborate' in a mutually
beneficial manner, such that the organisation is best served'".
These mechanisms for conflict resolution in the bargaining process all make use of
power as a means for decision making in a political environment. "Power is the
medium through which conflicts of interest are ultimately resolved. Power influences
who gets what, when, and how,,5o. In political decision making the role of power and
status cannot be underestimated and deserves further discussion.
Power
Power can be outlined as the fourth characteristic of political decision making. The
political decision making process is unpredictable and pliable. In such an
environment, power often becomes a motivator for action. Power as a defined
concept, has various meanings and interpretations, and enjoys by no means
definitional certainty". For our purposes we shall use Robert Dahl's52 definition " ...
power involves an ability to get another person to do something that he or she would
not otherwise have done,,53. The desire for power may have potentially corruptive and
counter-productive effects for the organisation as a whole. In such cases, the decision
making forum becomes a vehicle whereby people are able to mobilise their own
agendas'". "The relative power of ... different groups of people .. , is as relevant to the
final decision as the appeal of the goals they seek or the cogency and wisdom of their
46 Thomas 1976: 900
47 Thomas 1976: 900
48 Thomas 1976: 900
49 Thomas 1976: 900
50 Morgan 1997: 170
51 Morgan 1997: 170
52 1957
53 As formulated by Morgan 1997: 171
54 It is of course desirable to align the objectives of the organisation and the individual in such a
manner that they broadly overlap. An organisation needs to select individuals who in outlook will be
able to represent and serve the objectives of the organisation.
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arguments'f ', In organisations, " ... [plower structures rest primarily not on a social
consensus concerning expectations about privileges or rights between superiors and
subordinates, but on distribution of resources, by means of which compliance with
demands can be enforced ...,,56.
In organisations, a number of the manifestations of power can be identified: In the
institutionalised form thereof, power is posited in 'formal authority'f". Formal
authority is legitimised power, which is accepted on the basis of social consensus, for
the purpose of running or managing an organisation and is typically underpinned by
some form of organisational constitution or charter".
Power may also be derived through the controlling of organisational mechanisms. Of
this type a number can be identified: Power may rest in the ability to control scarce
organisational resources". The leverage that a player may have over limited
organisational resources can be hugely empowering'", Power may also be derived
from the "use of organisational structure, rules, regulations, and procedures't'". In
such a case, the structural features of the organisation determine where the leverage
points lie. Exploitation of such structures becomes an effective source of power. To
this one may add that control over technology in organisations can also become a
source of power'", Technology is the tool, by which an organisation is able to
generate some or most of its outputs. Control thereof is an effective source of power.
As an example, control of the military in any government fundamentally influences
power relations. In addition, the ability to control the decision process confers power
upon the playerïsj'". In this regard, Morgan distinguishes between controlling the
" ... decision premises, decision processes, and decision issues and objectivesï'",
These distinctions are part of Morgan's brief unpacking of decision making and
55 Allison 1971: 157
56 Pettigrew 1973: 26
57 Morgan 1997: 172
58 Morgan 1997: 172
59 Morgan 1997: 173
60 Morgan 1997: 173
61 Morgan 1997: 175
62 Morgan 1997: 184
63 Morgan 1997: 178
64 Morgan 1997: 178
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denote, firstly, what is to be decided upon, secondly, by whom and in what manner
and, lastly, according to what criteria'". Power becomes manifest by virtue of
controlling the process that determines the allocation of resources. "Control of
boundaries" may also be a significant source of power'". In organisations, there are
usually a number of semi-autonomous divisions or departments. The control and
management of the various overlapping areas, boundaries or interfaces between the
different divisions of an organisation can be a source power'". An understanding of
the various intra-organisational boundaries could accordingly further the pursuit of
power. Lastly, power may be held through the "control of knowledge and
information'f". Information is the basis upon which decision making takes place. The
control thereof may advance, retard or render useless the decision making process.
This point will be further considered when we look at communication flows below.
Power is also manifest in more tacit forms. The management of and "ability to cope
with uncertainty" may be a source of power'", Uncertainty in organisations can be
exploited. Players may be able to confront uncertainty in the external or internal
environment of the organisation 70. Exploitation of such conditions may render the
player powerful. Players may also derive power through a series of "interpersonal
alliances, networks, and control of 'informal organization't'". In such instances,
players become powerful by virtue of their informal relationships with other
organisational players. These relationships create the opportunity for making use of
organisational resources, which would otherwise not have been possible. In addition,
power may be derived through "symbolism and the management of meaning'r". The
focus of such power lies in managing meaning or constructing reality for the
organisational participants, through the manipulation of symbols and interpretations,
in such a way that they becomes meaningful to the organisational participant. The last
manifestation of tacit power may result from "the management of gender relations" in
6S Morgan 1997: 178 -179
66 Morgan 1997: 181
67 Morgan 1997: 181
68 Morgan 1997: 179
69 Morgan 1997: 183
70 Morgan 1997: 183
71 Morgan 1997: 186
72 Morgan 1997: 189
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organisations 73. Perceptions towards gender issues and the actual practice of gender
equality in organisations may well determine the actual power of the different sexes in
organisations. Situations do exist in organisations, where one or the other gender may
be systematically discriminated against. The 'glass ceiling' in organisations is such an
example, and prevents women from advancing commensurately with their male peers.
A final manifestation of power is to be found In the "control of
counterorganizations't". In such a case, power is derived by virtue of the player being
part of a counter-organisation. The counter-organisation is external to the organisation
and is a means of countering the build-up of power within the organisation by a small
and select group of players": Labour or trade unions are the most common example,
but in modern organisational life a number of groups could fulfil such a role; these
could include environmental groups, lobby groups or even the media.
In the context of the political decision making model, power is primarily concerned
with the ability to make decisions, control the flow of information and motivate
people to action. The implications of power for the decision making process are
legion. The power distributions and the ways in which it is used can largely determine
what an organisation decides on and what actions flow forth. The control and
manipulation of power impacts greatly on the process and results that political
decision making delivers.
Communication Flows
The last characteristic of political decision making is concerned with the
communication flows that are central to all political decision making processes. They
are the life-blood of the organisational decision making process. Controlling the flow
of information is an important consideration in understanding political decision
making processes. The ability to control the flow of information may provide leverage
and renders effective control over the decision making process. Controlling
information allows for the manipulation of the decision making process. In some
cases, information is manipulated on a rather extensive basis. Based on the work of
73 Morgan 1997: 191
74 Morgan 1997: 187
75 Morgan 1997: 187 - 188
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Meltsner", Choo notes that in certain cases, a preferred outcome or course of action
has already been 'decided' upon, however, reasonable justification has not taken
place 77. The justification for such a course of action is only assembled afterwards. The
necessary justifying information for the decision would be assembled and / or hidden
after the fact. Only justifying information would be used and any other information
that could potentially discredit the decision is conveniently omitted. In other cases,
full information regarding a particular issue, such as is required in the rational model,
may not be available. The lack of information may also be due to deliberate
withholding. This is done for the improvement of a bargaining position. Alternately, it
may be an unavoidable condition where the information is inaccessible or incomplete.
Closely related and following from the aforementioned, in the game of political
decision making reticence is often employed. In this context, it is a concept that can
be likened to that of 'hesitance' or 'restraint'. A player may be involved in the
decision making process, however, does not engage himself / herself fully". Such
ambiguous behaviour is thought to "permit(s) other players to interpret an outcome in
the way in which the shoe pinches least,,79. Reticence is an intentional silence or
reluctance to engage. Such behaviour is arguably manipulative and is typical of the
political decision making game. To further the hazy game of political decision making
other forms of vague communication can also be used. One such example is that of
'miscommunication'. As the word suggest, players communicate 'past' one another.
This results in possibly incorrectly interpreted understandings and tends to fuel
decision making conflict.
Applications and Developments
The major characteristics of political decision making have been examined
extensively, and one may ask whether the model of political decision making has
developed any further since Graham Allison's publication thereof? More recent
literature on political decision making does not indicate that the basic premises or
characteristics have been fundamentally altered. This model has also been used to
761976
771998: 183
78Allison 1971: 153
79Allison 1971: 179
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analyse other anomalous decision making situations'". The insights of Allison have
been incorporated into other models of decision making, namely the procedural and
anarchic models. The characteristics of political decision making have also been
evaluated and analysed extensively, on a behavioural level, in the psychological
sciences. Political decision making remains the means of " ... creating order out of
diversity ... ,,81 in organisations which consist of " .. .loose networks of people with
divergent interests who gather together for the sake of expediency (e.g., making a
living, developing a career, or pursuing a desired goal or objective),,82. Political
decision making functions in environments where the individual and not the process is
central to organisational decision making. This key point may perhaps explain why
the model of political decision making has not changed significantly.
80 One example would be the study that Lucien Vandenbroucke (1984) undertook of the failure of the
'Bay of Pigs' invasion. His analysis makes use of Allison's model for the unpacking of the decision
making processes that preceded the failed invasion.
81 Morgan 1997: 154
82 Morgan 1997: 166
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CHAPTER5
THE ANARCHIC MODEL
This chapter is concerned with the description and discussion of the anarchic model of
organisational decision making. Michael Cohen, James March and John Olsen
published this model in 197i. The model is popularly referred to as the' garbage can
model'. In this chapter, the nature of anarchic decision making shall be investigated
by examining the properties of anarchic organisations. Thereafter, the decision
making styles and trends in anarchic organisations shall be discussed. Lastly, brief
consideration shall be given to the additional developments and criticisms of the
model.
The Garbage Can
In classical organisation and decision theory, organisations typically have "clear
criteria of relevance in decision making ... [and] the outcomes of decisions [are]
independent of the micro structure of the broader context within which they
occur. .. solutions are appropriately associated with ... problems ... and ... problems are
appropriately associated with ... choices ... [,] people appropriately participate in ...
choices Such criteria provide a tight linkage of choices, problems, solutions and
people all [which] serve to buffer a particular choice from its context'". This has
typically been the view of the decision making process, up to the development of
Cohen's3 model. The decision making models discussed thus far, make problematic
assumptions regarding the link between human cognition, reaction to and influence of
complex situations". Cognitive ability is thought to function particularly well III
environments which require extensive interpretation and understanding.
However, as has been shown in the rational model, the contrary tends to be the case.
Reality is grossly simplified before human cognition is able to comprehend it. In
addition, in the preceding models criteria of 'relevance' are assumed. By criteria of
relevance, the following is understood: appropriate organisational participants know
1 'Michael Cohen, James March and John Olsen' will hereinafter be referred to as 'Cohen 1972' &
'Cohen 1979'.
2 Cohen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 24 - 25
3 1972
4 Cohen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 24
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when to participate in a decision situation and according to which criteria to resolve a
problems. Such an approach to decision making tends to buffer the actual choice from
the context within which it takes place". Such a separation of choice and context
cannot always be reasonably assumed. Furthermore, prior decision making models
have assumed that for every action in the environment, organisations are able to
deliver an appropriate reaction, which is thought to be a suitable response to the
action".
This clear causal link between environmental activity and directed organisational
response cannot always be assumed in anarchic environments. Cohen8 maintains that
this link is much more loosely coupled that previously assumed". Questioning the
underlying assumptions of prior decision makings models, brings us to Cohen's
model of decision making. Today, it is generally acknowledged that decision
processes (and organisational processes) are not as calculated, planned and controlled,
as many organisational theorists would like to believe'". The garbage can model is
one of the first academic attempts at understanding anarchic environments within
organisations as they pertain to the realm of decision making. In some cases,
organisations can be characterised by the anarchic nature of their activities I I.
5 Cohen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 24
6 Cohen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 24
7 Cohen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 17
81979
9 In March and Olsen 1979: 17
10 With respect to the making of decisions in organisations, the development of the rational and
procedural decision making (also a form of rational decision making) models, were attempts to set in
stone the functioning of organisations. It should be evident to any participant in any organisation, that
very rarely do organisations go about their business in a manner that is consistent with the above
mentioned decision making models. These models of decision making fail to capture the subtleties of
human behaviour and organisational experience. These models remain abstractions and struggle to
approximate reality. For Cohen (1972), the garbage can model marks an attempt to come to terms with
the complexity that characterises organisations. However, Cohen (1972) is still not able to avoid the
temptation of formal ising his model by means of computer simulation. Such a formalisation reduces an
attempt at understanding complexity to a rational procedure.
II Cohen 1972: 1
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Firstly, organisations may find themselves in environments, where their preferences
are not clearly defined or articulated". In other cases, organisations may find their
environment ambiguous. Ambiguous environments require organisations to undertake
processes that would assist in rendering the environment understandable':'. Secondly,
this ambiguity may be further heightened by the ability of organisational participants
to selectively participate in decisional situations". Decision makers within
organisations have limited time and energy. This vastly influences the ability of the
decision maker, hence the necessity for selectivity in decision making processes.
Lastly, organisations tend to learn and sustain themselves in an unsystematic and
inconsistent manner. The manner in which the organisation survives is not fixed, but
is rather a case of staggering from one organisational occurrence to the next. To use
the terminology of Cohen, the 'technology' of the organisation is unclear".
These three properties about the working of certain organisations'? suggest an
organisational format of 'organized anarchy'{', The organisation has purpose and
preferences, but these are not clearly defined. The organisational environment is also
poorly understood. Furthermore, organisational insiders do not necessarily understand
the organisational processes. Lastly, the decision makers and organisational
participants are seen as capricious. 18
The garbage can model is a response to decision making in organisations that can be
characterised by the three foregoing organisational properties. Organisational
experience and decision making then consist principally of flows or streams of
problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. " ... [O]ne can view a
choice opportunity like a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and
12 Cohen 1972: 1
13 The question of ambiguity was addressed at length in Chapter 3 and will not be discussed further.
14 Cohen 1972: 1
15 1972: 1
16 Cohen's (1972) study focuses on decision making processes within universities in the USA. The
model, however, is most undoubtedly applicable to other organisational types as well.
17 Cohen 1972: 1
18 This model by its very nature is unclear in its content. This can be principally ascribed to the fact
that the model tries to characterise decision making in a complex and poorly understood environment.
The scholar of decision making is left with a model, which defines the parameters and space within
which this type of decision making takes place, but does not give content thereto.
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solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated. The mix of garbage in a
single can depends on the mix of cans available, on the labels attached to the
alternative cans, on what garbage is currently being produced, and on the speed with
which garbage is collected and removed from the scene,,19. Stated in another way, this
model describes complex streams of activity in organisations. Organisations are
conceived as being collections of problems and solutions, in which the interplay of
elements take place. In addition, organisations are understood to have the capacity
required to connect these problems and solutions at appropriate times. "A decision
then happens when problems, solutions, participants and choices coincide,,2o. 21
The organisations studied by Cohen could be distinctly characterised by their absence
of clearly defined preferences'", Structured and systematic decision making requires a
set of preferences that serve as the guiding measure whereby occasions for decision
making are used. The absence of such preferences, i.e. the criteria against which
decisional situations are ascertained, is inherently destabilising for the organisation. If
an organisation does not have a set of criteria against which occurrences within and
outside the organisational environment are weighed, how can it know when it has to
make a decision on a matter that in actual fact requires a decision? The apparatus that
prompts an occasion for decision making is absent. The stimulus that announces the
occasion for heuristic activity is not present.
The foregoing is an extreme case and most organisations would not function in the
absence of preferences, however, situations do exist where preferences are poorly
defined, conflicting or inconsistent across the organisationv'. The preferences of such
organisations are rather collections of ideas or loosely coupled preferences, for which
overall coherence is lacking. An implication hereof is that organisations do not
necessarily act according to their preferences, but rather define their preferences
according to their actions'". Taken one step further, organisations in such as a position
19 Cohen 1972: 2
20 Choo 1998: 184
21 The metaphor shall be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
22 Cohen 1972: 1
23 Cohen 1972: 1
24 Cohen 1972: 1
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engage in an ongoing process of making their environment sensible through action.
Organisations discover their preferences through a series of actions/".
In such a case it is possible that the organisation may find itself in an internally and I
or externally ambiguous environment. Due to the very way in which the organisation
goes about defining preferences, ambiguity becomes a necessary condition in the
model of Cohen26. In order to establish their preferences organisations need to explore
the environment. 27 The process of defining preference is an occasion for sense
making, which requires some understanding of the ambiguous environment. The
occasion for making a decision itself can be prompted by ambiguity. "Environmental
actions and events are frequently ambiguous. It is not clear what happened, or why it
happened. Ambiguity may be inherent in the events, or be caused by the difficulties
participants have in observing them. The complexity of, and change in, the
environment often overpower our cognitive capacity=". This partly sets the stage
upon which decision making takes place. Organisations find themselves in an
environment, in which they are not really guided by a coherent and consistent set of
preferences and do not have the luxury (as they, putatively, do in rational decision
making) to be able to understand their environment. This makes the pursuit and
awareness of decision making highly problematic.
The model of Cohen29 looks at the question of organisational survival. Cohen is of the
opinion that in an anarchic organisation the members of an organisation do not
entirely understand their own internal organisational processes'". This has senous
implications for the organisation. If the members do not understand how the
organisation operates, then organisational survival becomes more a question of good
fortune than good science. Not being able to understand extra organisational
uncertainty is understandable. It can be expected that, at times, organisations are not
able to understand their external environments. However, cases for intra
25 Cohen 1972: 1
261972
27 By analogy, the same could be said for people. For example, a person may not know what his / her
particular preferences are with regards to unfamiliar foods, unless he / she has tried a variety of them.
28 March and Olsen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 18
29 1972
30 Cohen 1972: 1
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organisational uncertainty may potentially be very troublesome. If the organisation's
internal environment is ambiguous enough and there are enough different
interpretations of what the organisation does and how it operates, then organisational
survival may be threatened just as much by the internal environment as by the
external environment.
Survival and adaptation in an organisation is the product of learning. Cohen maintains
that organisations, in the anarchic context, learn through a trial and error process".
Intuitively, this seems to be correct. The environment and the organisation are
changing, thus learning through traditiorr'i may not necessarily be appropriate.
Experiential learning is at work in the organisation. Organisations have a stock of
knowledge, which is a function of their experience. If organisations learn through a
trial and error procedure, then arguably they stumble from one organisational
experience to the next, where the ability to recover from previous mistakes at least
guarantees survival in the short term. Considering this type of learning and the
manner in which organisational processes function, the organisation does not seem to
have a clearly defined structure of processes that guides it through time and ensures
survival. The procedural apparatus or technology within the organisation required for
sustainability is lacking. This is very disconcerting, but can be expected in a context
of ambiguity.
The last property of an anarchic organisation concerns the manner in which
organisational members take part in the decision making process. According to Cohen
members within organisations participate in decisional situations in a fluid manner'<.
Put in another way, members selectively enter and exit decision situations. The level
and intensity of involvement can vary significantly through the organisation and over
the spectrum of members that an organisation may possess at any given time.
31 1972: 1
32 The concept of learning through 'tradition' denotes an organisational environment, where the
organisation is able to perpetuate itself by applying the methodologies that predate the present
generations of organisational members. In other words, a stock of knowledge is passed on from one
generation of participants in the organisation to the next. 'Traditional' learning typically functions in a
relatively constant and enduring environment. This, however, is very rarely the case today. The modem
organisational environment is typically subject to much change.
33 1972: 1
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This property of anarchic organisations highlights the actual decision making process
taking place within the organisation. A decision making process can be thought of in
temporal terms. In this regard, any decision making process is a self-replicating, self-
transforming and self-redefining process. Before a decision can be made, a process
needs to be undertaken that refines the content and understanding of the subject
matter, which is being decided upon. This process is necessarily intertwined with the
procession of time. Time and the interference of external events with the decision
making process may have a real influence on the ever changing content of the
decision making process. Time becomes the limiting factor for a participant's
engagement in a decision making process. Participants in decision making processes
only have a number of hours at their disposal to attend to decisional situations.
Typically, this attention is not exclusive, but is rather shared with a number of other
responsibilitiea'", Furthermore, the energy and conviction that participants bring to
decision making processes may vary significantly from situation to situatiorr".
Organisational participants do not engage in decision making processes in a
predictable and consistent manner, but rather selectively participate with varying
levels of application. In addition, with the procession of time, the decision making
process may change in content to such an extent that the participants in the process
are different from those who started the process". The decision making process is by
its nature such that it continually refines its content and requirements. These changes
may also require the maintenance of an appropriate audience, hence the possibility of
changes in participants ",
Selective participation can be explained in part as a necessary product of an ever
changing decision making process. However, March and Olsen have suggested a
number of other reasons, which may account for selective participation. A number of
psychologies may operate in determining the level of and purpose of participation.
Decision making processes and the instance of a decision "are a stage for many
dramas't". Firstly, people may participate in a decision making process, because it
34 Cohen 1972: 1
35 Cohen 1972: 1
36 Cohen 1972: 2
37 Cohen 1972: 1
38 March and Olsen 1979: 11
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creates the opportunity to activate standard operating procedures or organisational
routines. The activation of such a procedure is a form of "fulfilling role expectations,
duties and earlier commitments'r'". Secondly, decision making situations allow "for
defining virtue and truth, during which the organization discovers or interprets what
has happened to it, what it has been doing, what it is going to do, and what justifies its
actions,,4o. Participants in decision making processes may do so, selectively, because
it allows them to extol various organisational values, whether real or at a symbolic
level. Thirdly, decision making processes become opportunities for the "distribution
of glory or blame for what has happened ... and thus an occasion for exercising,
challenging or reaffirming friendship or trust relationships, antagonisms, power or
status relationships"41. Fourthly, people may participate in the decision making
process because it becomes an "occasion for expressing and discovering "self-
interest" and "group interest" for socialization, and for recruiting (to organization
positions, or to informal groups ),,42. Lastly, participation in the decision making
process may simply be undertaken for the purpose of "having a good time, for
enjoying the pleasures connected to taking part in a choice situation?",
These reasons reveal the various psychologies that are at work when participants
decide on the extent of their participation in a particular decision making process. It is
important to remember that a significant amount of personal psychology is involved
in organisations. Despite organisations being functional creations they are
nevertheless populated by people and their problems. Decision making processes
become occasions during which organisational dramas may unfold44. If decision
making processes become occasions upon which organisational participants are able
to, for example, "discover[ing] 'self-interest''' 45, then arguably, decision making
processes could become vehicles whereby participants are able to mobilise issues
other than ones requiring decisions. Decision making processes become arenas in
which the manipulation of personal and organisational values takes place. Central to
39 March and Olsen 1979: 11
40 March and Olsen 1979: Il
41 March and Olsen 1979: Il
42 March and Olsen 1979: Il - 12
43 March and Olsen 1979: 12
44 March and Olsen 1979: Il
45 March and Olsen 1979: Il - 12
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our understanding is that the decision making process is an occasion that IS
accompanied by further unpredictable behaviour from organisational participants.
If organisations truly behave in the manner described thus far, then it would be
possible that organisations could be viewed as environments in which "participants
arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing and what they have done while in the
process of doing it,,46.Decision making which is subject to such a process is for the
participants a process of reality construction. In other words, participants are able to
continually redefine what they are doing. In such a process, they may identify
problems for which no solutions exist or a solution / organisational artefact for which
a problem needs to be discovered. Cohen views such organisations as "a collection of
choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in
which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the
answer, and decision makers looking for work,,47.
This taxonomy of decision making within an organised anarchy may explain
Cohen's48 use of the garbage can analogy. Organisations become environments of
ever changing content. The content in such an environment consists of a number of
problems that have to be dealt with in the course of time, with some problems being
more urgent than other. Solutions may also be latent in the organisation. The
organisation may have in its stock of knowledge the capacity and ability to deal with
particular types of problems. It may have solutions to problems, which do not
presently exist. The coupling of solutions and problems requires the attention of
decision makers. Decision makers contribute to this process by being the activators
thereof. The application of their time and energy largely determines the extent to
which organisations are able to resolve problems successfully. In addition, the ability
of participants to participate selectively complicates the process even further.
An important tenet of the garbage can model is the dynamic nature thereof. New
decisional possibilities, interpretations and opportunities are created on a continual
basis. The presence of participants, decision making opportunities, solutions and
problems are all streams or flows of organisational experience. These four flows
46 Cohen 1972: 2
47 1972: 2
48 1972
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operate simultaneously'". For example, a particular problem may occur m an
organisation, for which the solution does exist, however, the organisational
participants are not able to apply themselves to the problem. Or a set of solutions and
capabilities exist within the organisation, however, no commensurate problem exists.
Or decision making occasions are not available to participants that have solutions to
particular problems.
Giving more substance to the four flows of organisational experience, 'problems' can
be thought of as any personal or organisational occurrence that becomes an Issue
within the context of the organisatiorr", This can be anything from a person's
personal problems that affect his / her performance, to production problems within an
organisation, or even problems relating to how an organisation goes about interpreting
an uncertain environment. Occasions do exist in organisations, when the organisation
produces an artefact that becomes a solution the moment the appropriate problem
arises. Thus it would be possible to say that solutions, latent within an organisation,
are looking for problems". The role of participants has been discussed at length, but it
is worth mentioning, as Rommetveit points out, that the garbage can is general
enough in its definition of participant interaction in a decision making process, such
that participants are able to enter and exit the decision making process according to
their definition of the situation or the problem at hand ". Lastly, choice opportunities
are the culmination of the decision making process. These are the "the occasions
when an organisation is expected to produce behavior that can be called a decision'Y'.
In the context of the garbage can metaphor, "each choice opportunity is an open
receptacle into which any currently unresolved issues may be dumped ... the longer the
49 At this point of our discussion and as has been noted, it is worth mentioning that Cohen (1972)
developed a computer simulation for the garbage can model. The simulation used problems, solutions,
the energy or application of participants to solutions and problems, and choice opportunities as the four
independent variables of the model. These variables are all functions of time. The simulation delivers
interesting results, which seem largely to agree with the observation of decision making in real anarchic
organisations (Cohen 1972: 11).
50 Cohen 1972: 3
51 Cohen 1972: 3
52 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 151
53 Cohen 1972: 3
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choice remains unresolved, the greater the potential range of issues that are defined as
relevant,,54.
This is an important point to note. The occasion for making a decision, invariably,
becomes an occasion upon which other unresolved issues are dealt with. In other
words, problems, which cannot be resolved at a particular time with a particular
decision, become part of a bundle of issues. These issues for which the appropriate
organisational solutions do not presently exist need to be dealt with at some later
stage. The longer an unresolved issue drags on, the more it gets attached to other
issues". The procession of time allows for the addition of information to the
understanding of a problem, as well as the redefinition of other organisational issues
in terms of the unresolved problem. Decision making as an occasion for
organisational activity, becomes an opportunity to lump together a whole lot of
problems and to attach current issues to prior unresolved problems. Organisations
become melting pots into which problems seeking solutions are dumped. Through this
addition process, old problems become more complicated. Solutions seeking for
problems are added to the mix. Organisational participants engage the problem and
solution mix on the basis of their own narrow and continual redefinition of the
situation.
The occasion for decision making, being the fourth aspect of the garbage can model,
brings together the other three streams of organisational experience. In the garbage
can model of decision making, it is the confluence of these four types of activities that
make decision making in anarchic organisations dynamic and unpredictable. "The
garbage can process is one in which problems, solutions and participants move from
one choice opportunity to another in such a way that the nature of the choice, the time
it takes, and the problems it solves all depend on a relatively complicated
intermeshing of elements,,56.
Decision Styles
If organisations go about the decision making process in the manner described above,
then the question can be asked what kind of decisions do get made? What is the nature
54 Olsen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 86
55 Olsen 1979 in March and Olsen 1979: 86
56 Cohen 1972: 16
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of the decisions that are being made? Cohen drew some interesting conclusions both
from the simulations and the observations of decision making in anarchic
organisational environments. Principally, the following three styles could characterise
decision making: decisions are made by 'resolution, oversight and flight'5?
In cases where a decision takes place by resolution, the resultant decision is primarily
a function of time and the application of energy to a problem, i.e. working on a
problem ", An organisation faces a particularly problematic situation that requires the
exercise of choice. However, the choice is not immediately made and the occasion for
decision making is delayed. With the procession of time, the organisation is able to
learn more about the problem and gain greater understanding in the tailoring of a
solution. Eventually, enough organisational resources have been applied to the
problem such that the organisation is able to create or recognise the right solution.
The occasion for decision making then merely couples the problem with the
solution'". This style of decision making is the expected result of the decision making
process. Put differently, participants know that a particular problem will be eventually
solved; it is merely a matter of working at it.
57 Cohen 1972: 8
58 Cohen 1972: 8
59 Cohen (1972) treats problems and solutions as reasonably autonomous organisational artefacts. This
is intentionally so and is also an underlying assumption of the model. However, the autonomy or
decoupling of problems, solutions, choice situations and decision makers or participants cannot always
be assumed. Cohen offers the following justification for this approach, " ... [a]lthough decision making
is thought of as a process for solving problems, that is often not what happens. Problems are worked
upon in the context of some choice, but choices are made only when the shifting combinations of
problems, solutions, and decision makers happen to make action possible" (1972: 16). Whether one can
make such an assertion as to the independence and autonomy of solutions, problems, decision makers
and choice opportunities within the context of complex environments remains a field of study in itself.
The notion that solutions without problems and problems without solutions are latent in an organisation
is questionable. This would require further study into the nature and structure of problems, solutions,
choice opportunities, decision makers and their respective interactions and absences. Cohen does
concede that such a decoupling may not necessarily mirror real-life organisations (1979 in March and
Olsen 1979: 36). For the purposes of the garbage can model, we can accept that Cohen's conception of
the functioning of decision making processes in organisations is appropriate. Without such a
conception of organisational artefacts, the model fails to be understandable and workable.
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Decisions made by oversight are typically unintended consequences of the current
organisational decision making process. In the case of an oversight decision, an
organisation concerns itself with the resolution of a particular problem, trying to
couple a particular problem with a solution. However, in this case the occasion for
decision making stimulates or activates the possibility of making a completely
unrelated decision'". Participants will occupy themselves with a particular problem-
solution combination in a choice situation. The choice situation, however, provides
the impetus to exercise a different choice situation that does not concern itself in
anyway with the choice situation presently faced. The temptation to make such a
decision can only be accounted for on the basis of speed and ease61• This type of
decision making only takes place because organisational participants anticipate that
the decision to be made can be executed quickly. Furthermore, the process of decision
making does not require any significant application of organisational resources.
Alternately, it can be argued that such a decision can be made on the basis that there
are enough available organisational resources that are not tied up in the decision
making process that currently faces the organisation'". Organisations go about their
decision making activities, however, if the opportunity arises to make another
decision quickly and easily then they typically do so. The decision is made while
overlooking or neglecting the current decision making process.
The last decision style is that of flight. This type of decision making is characterised
by an unresolved choice situation, where the problem-solution coupling is not
optimal. This state of affairs continues until a better choice presents itself. This choice
is per definition better suited and more attractive to the problem that requires
resolution'". Given the autonomous view of problems and solutions of Cohen", this
could be understood in one of two ways: either choices are able to move from one
problem-solution set to another, or problems can be applied to different choice
situations. In the strict sense of the garbage can model, choice situations attract
problems, the longer the choice situation remains the more problems are attracted and
60 Cohen 1972: 8
61 Cohen 1972: 8
62 Cohen 1972: 8
63 Cohen 1972: 8
64 1972
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become relevant to it. If a new choice situation arises, it may well be more attractive
to a particular problem, which in itself is attached to a different choice situation. An
important subtext to the style of flight is that the original choice situation may be
incorrectly associated with a particular problem. In other words, the organisational
participants erred in their application of a problem to a choice situation. This accounts
for the inability to resolve the choice or decision occasion. Once the problem has been
removed from the choice situation and coupled with a better choice situation, the
original decision could potentially be made'". The original choice situation is not able
to resolve the problem that was (often incorrectly) attached to it. The resolution of the
problem becomes the concern of the newly arrived choice situation. It is important to
note that no decision has been made. Problems have merely been shifted from one
choice situation to another. Hypothetically, a primary choice situation that has a
problem associated with it may 'lose' the problem to a different and more appropriate
secondary choice situation. In a sense the problem has 'flown' away. The following
figure (Figure 4) graphically depicts this style of decision making.
Decision Maki ng by Flig ht
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Figure4 Based on Cohen 1972
In Figure 4, Problems A, Band C are associated with Choice Situation 1. However,
Problem C is incorrectly associated and leaves Choice Situation 1, at the point in time
when Choice Situation 2 becomes apparent to the organisation. No decisions have
65 Cohen 1972: 8 - 9
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been made, however, the coupling of problems to choice situations in the organisation
have changed.
At this stage it may be worth considering the decision making trends in organisations
that make decisions in the manner suggested by the garbage can simulations. The
following section will be concerned with the discussion of decision making trends in
anarchic organisations.
Decision Making Trends in Anarchic Organisations
Cohen'" used a computer simulation of the garbage can model to simulate decision
situations and decision frequencies, i.e. how many decisions were made in a particular
set of circumstances, and furthermore, what type of decisions. The outcomes of the
simulations and the observation of decision making in a real life situation in
university environments are most interesting and important for an understanding of
how organisations operate in anarchic environments.
Firstly, decision making by resolution in anarchic organisations is, actually, not the
most common style'". This has also proved to be the case in practice'". Intuitively,
this is also correct in so far as organisations occupy themselves with problems that
need resolution, however, the opportunities to make decisions by flight or by
oversight are more frequent and are generally occasions where the level of ease in the
decision making process is significantly higher than the making of decisions through
resolution. Decisions made by resolution require of the organisation to work at the
problem. The temptation of making a quick decision, whilst engaged in a significantly
more complex process of resolving a difficult decision situation, has been found to be
a salient feature of decision making in anarchic organisations. Organisations rather
engage in quick effortless decision making and halt the more taxing task of decision
making by resolution. Decision making by resolution is ostensibly the approach that
organisations take, when initially faced with a particular problem. However, in the
course of the decision making process, other problem-solution couplings may occur,
which would present to the organisation an opportunity to make a choice. Such
opportunities for decision making are typically utilised by organisations. This is an
66 1972
67 Cohen 1972: 9
68 Cohen 1972: Il
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interesting conclusion drawn by Cohen?", in so far as organisations are not necessarily
as focused in their decision making activities as previous models of decision making
would suggest. Organisations seem to be distracted by the opportunity to make a
quick decision, despite the fact that it is unrelated to the problem that they are
presently trying to resolve.
Secondly, Cohen found that the decision making is greatly influenced by the level of
activity" and the decision making agenda within the organisation.", Cohen found that
if the level of activity in an organisation increases (i.e. the difficulty and number of
problems faced, the number of participants involved and the amount of organisational
resources required in the resolution of problems), then fewer rather than more
decisions get made.". More decisions are made by flight and oversight than by
resolution. Problems being worked on in the present are addressed through resolution.
However, the activity of resolution is a slow process and hence does not lead to the
making of many decisions. Whilst the organisation is engaged in the process of
resolution, it typically has the opportunity to make a host of unrelated decisions by
flight and oversight. In addition, an increase in the level of activity is also
characterised by participants moving more frequently from one decision situation or
set of problems to another". A further conclusion is that problems take longer to
solve".
These various observations, as they relate to the efficiency with which organisations
make decisions, all point to a very interesting organisational factor. An increase in the
level of complexity experienced by the organisation suggests an increase in the level
of activity in the organisation. This complexity can be the result of numerous factors.
A greater work load or energy application by the participants in the decision making
process, can significantly influence the ability of participants to successfully engage
69 1972
70 Cohen (1972) defines 'energy' and 'load' as elements of his simulation of decision making
situations. For our purposes, I have translated them into a more suitable term, namely 'level of
activity', which does not require an understanding of the technical details of the simulation, but still
allows us to discuss the conclusions in a meaningful manner.
71 1972: 9
72 Cohen 1972: 9
73 Cohen 1972: 9
74 Cohen 1972: 9
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in other decision making processes. This can be expected, because people have limits
to their abilities of dealing with activities and situations. People can only be stressed
up to a certain level of activity, before further personal participation starts to result in
diminishing productivity. In a series of decision making processes, where a
participant or group of participants is increasingly expected to contribute, it can be
expected that at a certain point, participants would cease being any more efficient and
productive, but would rather contribute to an overall reduction in efficiency. This
seems to be the case in anarchic organisations, where a rising level of decision
making activity begins to undermine the participants' capacity to engage in decision
making processes successfully. Hence, it could be argued, that there is a point of
optimal participant involvement in decision making processes within organisations,
that would deliver the most efficient execution of decision making processes.
A further consideration is the difficulty of the problem. As can be expected, increases
in the difficulty of problems, or of the derivation of solutions, would typically require
greater application of the participants' energies and capabilities. In general, as the
complexity of the problem increases, so does the time required to solve such a
problem. Cohen noted that in periods of high organisational activity, participants
tended to move into and out of decision situations, moving from one problem to
another, without significantly solving problems.
This is an interesting finding, in so far as it suggests that, at certain levels of
organisational activity, participants are not able to occupy themselves with the
resolution of a particular problem or set of problems, but rather succumb to the
temptation of engaging a number of problems in an ineffectual manner and jump from
one problem to another. Participants would seem to fiddle with one problem, then try
another and so forth in a rather ineffectual manner. A spectrum of complex problems
would each be given light treatment in the hope that a solution will be found quickly.
However, as time progresses the participants realise the complexity of the problem
and move on to another problem, which offers the hope of quick resolution. This
behaviour pattern in part explains why organisations tend to typically make decisions
by flight and oversight rather than by resolution. It is significantly easier to make a
decision in a case where a choice situation offers a solution to another latent problem
or activates the possibility to make an unrelated decision. Decision making in
organisations tends to follow the 'path ofleast resistance'.
87
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Problem latency adds to the perplexity experienced in the decision making process.
Problem latency can be defined as active problems that reside in the organisation, but
for which no real solutions exist or to which no viable solution can be coupled": A
further feature that Cohen identifies in this regard is that the problem is generally
"recognized and accepted by some part of the organisation't'". 77 In general, the
number of latent problems in anarchic organisations place a notable burden on the
capacity of the organisation to resolve problems". Thus, the higher the level of
problem latency in an organisation the higher the level of organisational effort
required to address other problems. The presence of latent problems adds to our
understanding of why decision makers would move from one problem to the next
without really solving them. An organisation may, for argument's sake, have a
number of active problems for which no real solutions exist. These problems are
periodically picked up, examined and tried in the hope that some form of quick
resolution may come. Latent problems are so because they are enduring and do not
seem to be immediately resolvable. They commit organisational resources in an
unproductive manner and consume the time and energy of decision makers in an
unproductive manner.
In cases of high levels of problem latency and activity in an anarchic organisation, the
decision making process takes that much longer, than when an organisation is
relatively unoccupied", This is to be expected. With respect to the decision making
process, the presence of unresolved problems (latent problems), greater required
participation and higher levels of usage of organisational capacity, all seem to
75 Cohen 1972: 8
761972: 8
77 This line of discussion may be taken further. Within the sphere of organisational experience, a
problem or series of problems may be detected. The organisation however fails to resolve them, i.e. the
problems remain latent. If the resolution of a problem is understood as being a function of
understanding the sense thereof, then organisations need to improve their abilities of interpretation and
sense making. Improved understanding of a problem would ensure the removal of uncertainty or in
cases of failed understanding the removal of ambiguity. Thus, the question that ought to be asked is,
how can organisations in complex anarchic environments go about improving their abilities to interpret
and make sense of their environments (and by implication also their problems)? In doing so, problem
resolution would become a more thorough and effective process.
78 Cohen 1972: 10
79 Cohen 1972: 9
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generate increased amounts of organisational inertia. This naturally slows down the
decision making process and could suggest that organisations struggle to deal
effectively with complexity'".
The third important conclusion that Cohen draws, is that the structure of the
organisation greatly influences the effectiveness of the decision making process'". In
real organisations, as opposed to the abstractions that Cohen considers, organisations
have various rules and protocols that determine which organisational participants may
address which problems'". These rules or protocols determine the extent to which the
participants are supposed to involve themselves with particular problems and choice
situations. In practice, however, organisations rarely function, communicate and make
decisions in the manner suggested by their organigrams. Attempting to approximate
actual organisational behaviour in a theoretical manner would be exceedingly
difficult. As can be expected, Cohen83 is limited in simulating chaotic organisational
environments. In an attempt to overcome this problem, Cohen84 views organisations
through the prism of problem occurrences and the occasions for making choices or
decisions. Using such an approach Cohen conceives of three base case organisations,
which will be considered shortly. The approach has been to conceive of organisations,
where problems are graded on a continuum from unimportant to very important and
where the access to choice situations is specified'". By analogy, this system is meant
to mirror organisations, where important problems get addressed with urgency and
who are able to mobilise the organisational resources where necessary, and where
conversely unimportant problems get the lowly treatment that they usually do. In an
abstract sense, a problem that is highly important to the organisation would have
access to all possible choice opportunities, whether they are able to resolve the
problem or not.
80 If organisations had been able to deal with complexity in an effective manner, the study thereof
would naturally have been superfluous.
81 1972: 9 10
821972: 7
83 1972
84 1972
85 Cohen 1972: 5 - 6
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Given this basic understanding of decision making in anarchic organisations, Cohen'"
devised three organisational types. 'Unsegmented organisations' allow access for each
and every problem, regardless of level of importance, to the entire spectrum of choice
opportuniry'" that may exist in the organisation'", Furthermore, in an unsegmented
decision making structure, each and every decision maker and participant has access
to each and every choice situation. There is no limit on the extent of participation by
decision makers. The second organisational type is that of a 'hierarchical structure'V.
In the hierarchical structure, important problems have access to many choices; in
contrast unimportant problems have limited capacity for resolution due to their
unimportance'". For example, a problem which influences the survival of an
organisation is necessarily dealt with by the most senior and responsible participants
in the organisation and also has the commitment of resources for speedy resolution.
The level of importance of the problem determines to a large extent the organisational
attention. As the level of importance rises, problems proceed through a hierarchy of
choice opportunities'". The last organisational form that Cohen considers is that of a
'specialized organisation'i". In this case, each problem is coupled to a specific choice
situation. According to Cohen's model, each choice situation can only consider two
problems and each decision maker is only confronted with one choice situation, where
two problematic cases are the objects of consideration'".
In the light of the three above mentioned decision making structures, a number of
trends were observed. These trends, although derived in a theoretical simulation,
largely mirror the activities of the real life organisations that Cohen studied".
Segmented organisations (of which specialised and hierarchical organisations are
subsets) tended to resolve more unresolved problems than unsegmented
86 1972
87 Choice opportunities serve as the interface with participants who apply their capabilities according to
necessity and the seriousness of a problem.
88 Cohen 1972: 5 - 6
89 Cohen 1972: 6
90 Cohen 1972: 6
91 Cohen 1972: 5 6
92 Cohen 1972: 6
931972: 6
941972:11
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organisations'". This is due to the fact that each choice situation only occupies itself
with a very limited number of problems. This type of decision making structure
tended to decrease the presence of latent problems in the organisation". A further
observation was that hierarchical organisations were best suited to resolving problems
of higher importance'", This is self-evident, since problems of greater importance
usually command a higher level of organisational attention. In addition, Cohen found
that problems that were recognised at an earlier stage than others, also tended to get
resolved earlier'". Hence, the temporal property of a problem influenced the
resolution thereof. The advantage of hierarchical organisations is that they cue
problems and choice situations in accordance with the importance of the problem and
the time at which the problem becomes recognisable to the organisation".
A further interesting finding was that organisations in the mould of the garbage can
tend to be less successful in making important decisions than unimportant
decisions 100. There is here a distinct element of decision failure. The important
decisions fail to resolve problems that were deemed important. This is accounted for
by the manner in which important decisions are made. Important decisions are usually
made by oversight or by flight'!". For example, in the case of decision making by
flight, an organisation has a serious problem, which it is not able to resolve by making
the appropriate choice. A better choice opportunity is found to which the problem is
attached and the problem is putatively removed for the time being. This however
results in decision failure, in so far as a decision has been made in haste. It would
seem that problems are only truly solved through decisions made by resolution, i.e.
working at the problem and resolving the problem over the course of time.
The other case that tends to result in the decision failure of important problems, is
when decisions are made by oversight. In such cases, organisational participants are
working on a problem-choice situation, however, a choice possibility would become
95 Cohen 1972: 10
96 Cohen 1972: 10
97 Cohen 1972: 10
981972: 10
99 Cohen 1972: 10
100 Cohen 1972: 10 - 11
101 Cohen 1972: 11
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apparent that would allow them to solve an unrelated, but important problem.
Resolution by oversight only takes place, when the occasion for making a choice can
take place reasonably quickly and effortlessly. Cohen's simulations produced the type
of behaviour (which was also observed in practice), which could be " ... directly
related to the phenomenon in complex organisations of important choices which often
appear to just happen ... ,,102.The likelihood of unimportant choices being successful is
also interesting in so far as unimportant choices are made on the basis of resolution'?'.
This seems to suggest, that unimportant choices remain latent and do not place any
particular burdens on the organisation, but are merely addressed in the course of time
or left alone until such time as they can be appropriately resolved.
Although particular styles of decision making were associated with decision failure,
an interesting and perhaps strange set of instances was noted. The highest levels of
failure were found amongst the most important and least important decisions". In
terms of the success or avoidance of decision failure, intermediate choices tended to
be more successful in their resolution of problems lOS. In this regard, Cohen sheds
some light on why organisations that are characterised by complex and anarchic
environments are able to survive, especially when they "do not know what they are
doing,,106. Organisations in complex environments are facing constant changes in
norms, decision criteria and the content of their environments. This makes appropriate
decision making highly problematic and unpredictable. Based on the findings of
Cohen' ", organisations seem to get most of both the important and the trivial
decisions wrong. However, the decisions of intermediate importance (those that could
possibly be responsible for the general maintenance of the organisation) seem to be
made successfully. Hence, organisations in complex environments manage to barely
perpetuate themselves, by virtue of 'doing at least something right'. The difficulty
such organisations have, is that decision making in a complex environment requires a
process of investigation and discovery into the appropriate decision making system or
1021972: 11
103 Cohen 1972: 11
104 Cohen 1972: 11
105 Cohen 1972: 11
1061972:11
1071972
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procedure for the organisation 108. Such organisations do not have the luxury of
predictable and known decision making structures and procedures, but rather have to
discover an appropriate structure, which itself may be subject to change on an
indeterminable basis. Arguably, discovery of appropriate decision making structures
would be achieved through experiential learning and intuition.
Although the decision makers move in and out of choice situations, a further finding
of Cohenl09 was that decision makers tended to accompany particular problems. A
person or group of persons tended to track certain types of problems and also dealt
with these problems on an ongoing basis'!". This is a logical expectation, in so far as
decision makers who have prior experience relating to the resolution of a particular
type of problem, would usually be best suited to address similar types of problems in
the future. Within the context of the garbage can, problems, solutions participants and
choice opportunities are of course all independent organisational occurrences, and
Cohen found that problems and decision makers or participants would track one
another from one choice opportunity to the next until the problem was resolved III. In
the parlance of the model, one could say that problems meet the same type of decision
makers and decision makers meet the same kind of problems in different contexts
time and again 1I2.
This concludes the discussion of the garbage can model of decision making. We shall
now devote attention to the further development of decision making in anarchic
environments.
Additional Developments and Criticisms
After Graham Allison's model of political decision making, Cohen'sl13 model was a
further attempt to offer a theory of decision making, which was rooted in a "social
interactive process"!" 115.Recognition was given to the idea that decision making
108Cohen 1972: 11
1091972
110Cohen 1972: 9-10
1111972: 10
112Cohen 1972: 10
1131972
114Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada & Saint-Macary 1995: 262
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was often the product of chaotic and socially interactive processes. These processes
by their very nature are difficult to unpack and examine. Cohen 116 did however
provide a model that accounted for decision making originating out of chaotic and
disordered circumstances 117. Decision making models after Cohen 118 have
increasingly reflected this feature of organisational decision making.
Lawrence Pinfield 119 undertook an empirical study, applying the garbage can model to
the analysis of decision making processes of organisations. He examined amongst
other things how the context of the organisation, the role of the participants, and time
influenced the decision making process 120. He found that the assumptions of the
garbage can model could not always be accepted and that the model was
incomplete'<'. In particular, he found that participation in decision making was not
'randomly fluid', but was rather determined by the structure of the organisation 122. In
addition, participation in choice opportunities could be controlled throughout the
decision making process 123. Furthermore, choice opportunities were managed and did
not occur in a haphazard manner'/". The organisation could in actual fact control the
formation of choice opportunities!". These assertions negate the assumptions that
participation is fluid and that choice opportunities basically only occur when
problems, solutions and decision makers coincide.
A further development has been the acknowledgement that the examination of
decision making as a decision and its foregoing process is perhaps not the most
appropriate unit of analysis. According to Langley, the study of decision making is
best served by looking at the 'issues' underlying the decision rather than the decision
115 Hereinafter 'Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada & Saint-Macary 1995' will be referred to as
'Langley 1995'.
1161972
117 Langley 1995: 262
1181972
1191986
120 1986: 366 - 367
121 Pinfield 1986: 386
122 Pinfield 1986: 386
123 Pinfield 1986: 386
124 Pinfield 1986: 386
125 Pinfield 1986: 386
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making process and the actual decision'f". According to Langley, a clear decision
process cannot necessarily be identified from the outset, but rather particular issue
streams come onto the organisational agenda'<'. Organisations work with issues or
streams of issues and not necessarily with decision processes. Despite having made a
decision, organisations are often confronted with the problem that the issue has not
been rcsolved'r". Such a view of organisational experience is much more meaningful
and a better approximation thereof, than the retrospective construction of decision
making in the garbage can decision making model.
The garbage can model received even more criticism. According to John Padgett, the
garbage can model is divorced from organisational theory, which describes structures
and processes common to organisations'?". The model appears to be only applicable
to "highly decoupled and unorthodox organizational systems" 130 and it appears that,
superficially, "the world is so contextual, idiosyncratic, and capricious that
management is by definition impossible"!". Padgett tries to resolve this bind by
investigating the possibility of garbage can decision making in organisations that are
structured and hierarchical. He develops a hierarchical garbage can model, where a
bureaucratic-type organisation experiences ambiguity. This predicament is resolved
by ensuring that the "flows of issues ... are embedded within classical bureaucratic
chain-of-command constraints and operate through more explicit .. .individual-level
models of information processing and decision making"!".
Further theories of garbage can decision making were offered, however, these theories
do not enjoy as much recognition and are different conceptions of decision making,
and may not necessarily be likened to or be recognised as offshoots of Cohen's model
of garbage can decision making. Increasingly, theories of decision making are
beginning to bridge the gaps amongst different modes of decision making. These
theories however do not fall within the ambit of our discussion.
126 1995: 270
1271995: 270
128 Langley 1995: 270
129 1980: 583
130 Padgett 1980: 583
131 Padgett 1980: 584
132 Padgett 1980: 601
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CHAPTER6
COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
AND A META-PROBLEM
The concluding chapter of this thesis shall be concerned with two aspects.
Firstly, a comparative matrix shall be presented which will indicate how the preceding
models are similar and differ from one another. It attempts to summarise in a highly
compact form all the key features of the models that emerged from our analysis.
Secondly, and drawing on the comparative matrix, a major problem of organisational
decision making theory shall be discussed. It is the meta-problem of how generic
organisational decision making activity can be understood without having to consider
the behavioural features of decision making.
Comparative Overview
On page 98 a comparative matrix (Table 1) is presented to show how the four models
of organisational decision making relate to one another. The models are compared on
the basis of seven organisational characteristics. These characteristics are by no means
exhaustive, but rather highlight some of the salient differences and similarities that
exist amongst the models. The matrix gives a final overarching view of the different
models of organisational decision making.
The different characteristics may briefly be described as follows:
Firstly, 'Theoretical Approach' shows how the models were conceived. Did they
result from an empirical study or was a hypothesis formulated and tested? This
comparison indicates whether the model is a product of imagination and then tested,
or whether it is based on the observation of organisational experience.
Secondly, 'Focus' indicates how the authors of the respective models view decision
making in the organisation. Is decision making in organisations defined as a
behavioural feature or a systemic property of the organisation or both? Is decision
making viewed as the product of individual behaviour or is it the output of a generic
organisational system?
Thirdly, 'Nature of Decision Making Process' highlights the central feature or
characteristic of the decision making process. How can the decision making process,
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reduced to its most basic element, be described? Is it an iterative process, can it be the
result of bargaining and negotiation, or is it simply to be understood as a collection of
flows of organisational experience?
Fourthly, 'Decision Making Style' is a comparison of how the organisation actually
makes a decision. What mechanism is used to reach a final decision in the decision
making process? Is a decision the result of analysis and calculation, or is it the result
of bargaining and negotiation?
Fifthly, 'Decision Making Means / Technology' indicates whether the organisation
understands the process that needs to be undertaken before arriving at a decision. Is
the process understood or does it need be discovered? To what extent does the
organisation understand how to arrive at a decision, or must the decision be
discovered through the decision making process?
Sixthly, 'Preference Definition' compares the assumptions that are made regarding
organisational preferences. Organisational preferences or decision making criteria
largely determine the outcome of the decision making process. Do the models assume
that preferences are clearly or poorly defined? Are the preferences (implicitly)
assumed or arbitrary?
Lastly, 'Organisational Environment' considers the assumptions that are made with
regard to the external environment of the organisation. Is the environment perceived
to be stable and / or slow changing, or is it chaotic and anarchic? The nature of the
external environment may largely determine the type of decision making process that
is undertaken.
This comparative presentation of the different characteristics is specifically
undertaken to highlight an important problem in the understanding of organisational
decision making. This problem shall be addressed in the following section.
The table (Table 1) is presented on page 98.
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Comparative Matrix of Organisational Decision Making
(Bounded) Political ProceduralRational Model Model Anarchic ModelModel
Theoretical Theoretical Empirical Empirical TheoreticalApproach
Focus Behavioural Behavioural Systemic BehaviouralSystemic Systemic
Nature of Bargaining Flows of anarchicDecision Making Iterative Iterative organisational
Process Conflict driven experiences
Decision Making Analysis Judgement Not indicated by
Style Calculation Bargaining Bargaining model
Bargaining Analysis
Decision Making
Clearly Not indicated Poorly understoodMeans I Discovery
Technology understood by model Discovery
Preference Clearly defined Arbitrary Implicitly Poorly definedDefinition assumed
Organisational
Stable Changing
Stable AnarchicEnvironment Changing
Table 1
The Meta-Problem of Organisational Decision Making
In the examination of the foregoing models of decision making a countless number of
problems can be identified. The details of the models provide room for endless
comparison, criticism and evaluation. The concluding intention of this thesis is,
however, not to evaluate the details of each model further, but rather to place the
models next to one another and highlight a crucial meta-problem. This problem
becomes apparent when the four models are placed next to one another and the
question is asked, 'What did these different models purport to describe or explain?'
The problem can be unpacked as follows:
On the one hand, we live in a 'society of organisations,l, where organisations form
the front for social interaction. Social interaction is constituted and defined by the
activities of organisations. Organisations in themselves do not exist like natural
I Drucker 1994
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objects, but are fundamentally abstractions. Only groups of people associated with
certain collective activities exist. To such collective activities we give the name
'organisation'. These organisations are brought to life by the shared vocabularies of
their inhabitants. These shared vocabularies are the shared meanings, organisational
culture, premises, that regulate conduct, and so forth". The construct of organisation is
not devoid of reality. Organisations are the functional creations and fronts by which
the majority of social interactions take place. In the society of organisations,
organisations make decisions and become the vehicles whereby social activity is
exercised and regulated.
On the other hand, decision making in organisations is ultimately undertaken by the
individuals therein. Decision making is an activity which only individuals can
ultimately perform. Yet at the same time, the organisation is the functional unit that
engages in social activity. Models describing decision making in organisations do so
in order to understand decision making as a product of the organisation. These models
strive to investigate and describe generic decision making activity. Accounting for
how decisions are actually made invariably returns to the study of individual or
behavioural decision making.
In describing organisational decision making a meta-problem is not resolved. How
does one separate the decision making of individuals from the organisation as the
decision making entity and the entity to which the decisions relate? Conceptually, in
describing organisational decision making, tension exists between the individual, i.e.
the decision maker, and the organisation, i.e. the social front for the execution of
decision making. Describing generic organisational decision making requires the
removal of behavioural or individual descriptions. However, the individual and the
decision are intertwined and inseparable. Thus, asking how organisations make
decisions always leads back to the individual. How does one describe generic
organisational decision making, when the activity of decision making is encapsulated
in the behaviour of the individual?
This problem is evidenced in the different approaches that the four models of decision
making take. In each case, the models try to describe generic organisational decision
making. However, as has been shown throughout this thesis, the various authors
2 The concept of an organisation as 'shared meaning' was discussed in Chapter 1
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struggle to maintain a coherent and systemic approach. Their focus in the description
of organisational decision making tends to oscillate between behavioural and
systemic.
In the model of perfect rationality, the conceptualisation of decision making does not
address decision making as a generic output of the organisation, but considers only
the decision making process, with no reference to the nature of the decision maker.
The nature of the decision maker, whether individual or organisation, is largely
irrelevant to the perfectly rational decision making process. The model is not
concerned with the unit of analysis or focus. Hence, it is possible to understand
rational decision making on a behavioural or systemic level. In perfect rationality, it is
not indicated how the decision making process may be reconciled with the concept of
'organisation'. In the bounded version of rational decision making the focus is
distinctly behavioural. Yet in describing rational decision making in organisations in
the bounded form, the use of rule decision making and standard operating procedures
still does not clearly indicate how an organisation makes a rational decision. In
addition, it is also not clear how (rational) decision making, which is a behavioural
phenomenon, can be understood as a generic organisational activity. Rational
organisational decision making cannot be extricated from the boundedly rational
individual in the organisation.
In the procedural model, the approach is putatively systemic. The decision making
process is concerned with the organisation and not overtly with the individual, yet as
the description thereof shows, decision making is still ultimately made by individuals
in a manner which agrees with the characteristics of political decision making.
Despite the description of a generic process for decision making, decisions are still
made through the judgements and bargaining of individuals. Reconciling individual
decision making with organisational decision making remains problematic.
In the political model, decision making in organisations is primarily a characterisation
of behavioural traits with a few generic aggregations thereof. The unpacking of the
characteristics of 'power', 'bargaining', 'communication flows' and so forth are
behavioural properties of decision makers. Aggregating these behavioural traits with
concluding observations such as organisations being arenas in which bargaining and
conflict resolution takes place, still does not satisfactorily answer the question of how
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the organisations make decisions. Describing generic organisational decision making
is still confined to a description of individual and group decision making.
In the fourth model, anarchic decision making also purports to describe organisational
decision making. This is achieved by delineating a number of central features of
organisational experience. Despite understanding decision making in organisations as
streams or flows of problems, solutions, choice opportunities and decision makers,
one is still required to confront the fact that choices are made by individuals. Flows of
problems, solutions and choice opportunities characterise the decision making
environment. The organisational decision still remains the prerogative of the
individual. In this case, an understanding the organisational decision making still
requires an understanding of individual decision making.
Fundamentally the problem lies therein that the link between the individual and the
organisation cannot be severed. Individuals and groups of individuals make decisions
on behalf of organisations, yet in the society of organisations, organisations engage
one another, not individuals. Understanding how organisations make decisions cannot
be clearly related to what people, in their hearts and minds, decide on in the
formalised structures called organisations. How the decision making of the individual
or group relates to the organisation is not entirely understood. The organisation is the
vehicle and the front for social dealings. The relationship between the vehicle for
interaction and the decision maker residing therein is not clearly understood. How
does one account for organisational decision making, without accounting for the
behavioural nature of the individual? In trying to approximate generic organisational
decision making activity, one is time and again confronted with having to describe the
behavioural aspects of individual decision making.
The models in this thesis clearly indicate the extent of this predicament. Intending to
describe generic decision making activity becomes frustrating, when one has to
continually confront matters of individual psychology. The development of further
models of decision making have also been attempts to understand the phenomenon of
organisational decision making. Yet these attempts have had to confront the same
problem. This meta-problem of organisational decision making has remained with
organisational theorists and will not easily be resolved adequately. Further
investigation of this problem is merited and can be done with the help of the insights
of Karl Weick.
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Bridging the Individual-Organisational Divide
Karl Weick3 understands decision making as an occasion for sense making. The
process of decision making is primarily an occasion to make sense of an incongruous
organisational environment. Decision making is aimed at negotiating uncertainty in
the organisational environment. What confronts the organisation is understood
through interpretation and sense making.
For our purposes, we shall consider Weick's discussion of Wiley's" approach to sense
making. For Wilei, sense can be made on three levels, viz. "the intersubjective, the
generic subjective, and the extrasubjective'". We are here only interested in the first
two. These terms denote the following:
The intersubjective is concerned with the social interaction of individuals in groups,
which are socially structured and where significant shared meaning is present in their
collective activities 7• In the intersubjective, the 'being' of persons is relevant and
fundamental to the intersubjective activity (in the organisation). Sense making in
organisations on the level of the intersubjective is dependent on rigorous personal
interaction, where people come to terms with uncertainty through communication,
interaction and decision making. Making sense in organisations at the level of the
intersubjective is concerned with understanding how change in the organisational
environment impacts on individuals and groups as organisational participants.
At a slightly higher level of abstraction, Wiley speaks of the generic subjective''. The
generic subjective is concerned with the enactment of roles and the adherence to rules
within the social structures of an organisation". In the generic subjective, the self or
personal characteristics are left behind and organisational participants are viewed as
interchangeable enactors of roles'". Making sense in organisations at the level of the
31995
41988
51988
6 In Weick 1995: 70
7 Wiley 1988 in Weick 1995: 71
8 The generic subjective was briefly looked at in the Politica! Mode! of Decision Making
9 Wiley 1988 in Weick 1995: 71
10 Wiley 1988 in Weick 1995: 71
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generic subjective is concerned with understanding how roles, functions and social
structures operate and change II.
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the concept of organisation is used in conjunction
with both levels of sense making. Within this taxonomy, it may be asked where the
organisation and organisational sense making is posited? For Weick, the organisation
is posited between the intersubjective and the generic subjective'<. This can be
accounted for on the following basis: Organisations are principally concerned with the
pursuit of particular goals':', To this end, they require organisational participants that
are able to perform the roles that result in the realisation of their objectives. The
generic subjective is concerned with the performance of roles and the adherence to
rules". The generic subjective provides the control and management mechanisms for
organisations. The intersubjective, however, provides the mechanism by which
organisational creativity is brought about and by which uncertainty is negotiated
through sense making and decision making". For Weick, " ... organizing is a mixture
of vivid unique intersubjective understandings and understandings that can be picked
up, perpetuated, and enlarged by people who did not participate in the original
intersubjective construction. People can substitute for one another in organizations,
but when they do those substitutions are never complete. There is always some loss of
joint understanding when the intersubjective is translated into the generic?".
According to the foregoing, organisation has to be understood on two levels. On one
level, acknowledgement is given to the behavioural aspects of people in organisations.
On another level, acknowledgement is given to the generic and interchangeable roles
that are enacted in organisations.
When we speak of organisations, we are concerned with a discussion at the level of
the generic subjective. This thesis has been an investigation into the nature of
organisational decision making, where the focus has been on the organisation and the
manifestations of generic decision making activity. A generic inquiry of
II Wiley 1988 in Weick 1995: 71
12 Weick 1995: 72
13 Drucker 1994
14 Weick 1995: 72
15 Weick 1995: 72
16 Weick 1995: 72
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organisational decision making is not focused on understanding the influence of
capricious personalities on decision making, but is rather focused on uncovering the
general or universal properties of decision making in organisations.
When one speaks of decision making, one necessarily does so at the level of the
intersubjective'", Decision making can be understood as sense making and is in that
respect an activity that is dependent on rigorous social interaction, where the input of
the individual is of fundamental importance. Decision making is an intrinsic feature of
intersubjective activity. It cannot be understood without reference to the individual.
Arguably, the generic subjective role of the decision maker may exist within an
organisation. However, in order to make decisions, interaction is required at the level
of the intersubjective.
For Weick, and drawing on Smircich and Stubbart'", organisations act as the bridging
mechanism between the intersubejctive and the generic subjective'". Organisations
become the mechanism by which collective social interaction is integrated
meaningfully into role-based activity. This draws us closer to understanding the meta-
problem. If organisation is the mechanism that bridges the intersubjective and the
generic subjective, then an investigation of generic organisational activity may
perhaps be intimately linked with intersubjective activity. Intersubjective activity is in
fact the content of generic activity.
This outlines the major problem of organisational decision making. When deciding to
investigate how organisations make decisions, one is necessarily interested in generic
decision making activity, i.e. the generic subjective. However, decision making is tied
up in the individuals residing in the organisation, i.e. the intersubjective. The different
models of decision making have struggled to bridge this divide. In trying to address
generic and structural features of organisational decision making, theorists still have
to consider the role of the individual in the organisation. A good example would be
from the procedural model. The model describes the decision process in generic terms
17 In the case of the individual, the sense making and commensurate decision making would take place
at the level of the intrasubjective. The intrasubjective is concerned with " .. .individual thoughts,
feelings, and intentions" (Wiley 1998 in Weick 1995: 70 - 71).
18 1985
191995: 73
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right up to the selection phase, at which point Mintzberg'" necessarily has to consider
the behavioural considerations of decision making. How does one make sense of
organisational decision making when one has to continually move between two
fundamentally different levels of understanding? How are these two levels of
understanding reconciled in a meaningful manner? How can the divide between
understanding the organisation and understanding decision making in the organisation
be bridged? Is there any other way, in which generic organisational decision making
activity can be understood, such that the behavioural implications of decision making
do not need to be considered?
This meta-problem will continue to plague organisational theorists. Whether the
authors of the respective models of decision making were particularly aware of this
problem at the time of their development is hard to say. However, upon comparison it
becomes evident that what they purport to explain generically is undermined by their
inability to meaningfully reconcile the rift between understanding the organisation
and understanding decision making as a product of the individual.
It would seem that this predicament cannot be resolved. Whether it is understood in a
positive or negative light still requires further study. The tension between the
individual and the organisation will perhaps never be resolved. In the examination of
organisational decision making, doing so at an intersubjective level, means that the
organisation is no longer the unit of analysis. Examining organisational decision
making at the level of the generic subjective gives insight into the generic nature of
the organisation, but does not facilitate the study of decision making. If this problem
cannot be resolved, then looking at organisations will always be a study at various
levels of abstraction. This may in fact be an intrinsic meta-feature of organisations,
and could perhaps be added as a further characteristic of the concept 'organisation'.
This problem has clearly not been resolved in this thesis. We merely hope to have laid
the groundwork for further relevant study thereof. Accordingly, we herewith conclude
the discussion of organisational decision making and the problems that plague the
understanding thereof (and thank the reader for staying with us)!
20 1976
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SUMMARY
This thesis has been an overview and description of four different models of decision
making, where the organisation and not the individual has been the focus of the study.
In each case, the decision making processes taking place in organisations that have
been described in the most generic sense possible.
The rational model assumes that organisations are able to make decisions in a
consistent and predictable manner. A number of assumptions are made about
organisations that do not seem to adequately reflect the experience of organisational
decision making. The procedural model of decision making is concerned with an
iterative process that organisations go through when attempting to make a decision.
This model is also closely related to the rational model. The political model
characterises a decision making process that is an essential part of most organisational
decision making processes. The political model illustrates the mechanism whereby
decision dilemmas are resolved. The anarchic model of organisational decision
making is concerned with the question of ambiguity in the organisational environment
and conceives of decision making as the result of the intermeshing of various flows of
organisational experience.
In the concluding chapter of this thesis a comparative matrix is presented. This matrix
compares the four models of decision making with respect to a number of salient
characteristics. In addition and importantly the meta-problem associated with studying
organisational decision making is explained. In understanding decision making in
organisation there is necessarily a tension between understanding behavioural activity,
i.e. decision making, and systemic organisational activity, i.e. generic role enactment.
Investigating decision making at the level of the organisation does not seem to resolve
this dilemma. This problem will in all likelihood never be resolved.
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